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The major findings of this study include the following:
(1) When appeals judges were aggregated in terms of their scores
on criminal procedures cases, differences were observed in the voting
behavior of Nixon appointees as compared to non-Nixon Democrats and non-
Nixon Republicans during fiscal 1970 to 1973.
(2) Nixon appointees voted more "conservatively" than these other
two judge groups. Non-Nixon Democrats were the most "liberal" group,
and non-Nixon Republicans fell in between the other two groups.
(3) However, when the circuit was introduced as a control, it was
found that (a) the relationship between the three judge groups varied
from circuit to circuit with only six circuits conforming to the hypo-
thesis; (b) the composite and median scores of Nixon appointees and non-
Nixon Republicans outside the South were virtually identical when only
the cases of fiscal 1973 were considered; and (c) bloc analysis of individ-
ual circuits revealed that Nixon appointees do not constitute monolithic
and sharply "conservative" blocs in any but the District of Columbia
circuit, where voting patterns of Nixon appointees were similar to voting
patterns of Nixon appointees to the Supreme Court.
(4) Moreover, when other background characteristics were entered
as controls on the appointing administration variable, the latter was
found to account for only a small proportion of the observed variances
,in voting behavior among the judges of the Courts of Appeals.
(5) There also appeared to be a relationship between the scores
of Nixon appointees and their sponsoring Republican Senator, where one
existed. The most "conservative" Nixon appointees were recommended,
for the most part, by the most conservative Republican Senator, or were
the choices of the Administration in the absence of eligible Republican
sponsors. This suggests that Senatorial courtesy was an obstacle to
the attainment of preferred administration nominees.
(6) Finally, doctrinal analysis of confession cases also indicated
that Nixon appointees did not always agree on confession issues, varying
in their legal positions not only from circuit to circuit but within
some circuits.
(7) The tentative conclusion, then, of this study is that,
although the Nixon appointees did appear more "conservative" when their
voting behavior was aggregated, they constituted, with the exception of
the District of Columbia circuit, nothing like the cohesive "conservative"
bloc of Nixon appointees which dominated criminal justice issues on the
Supreme Court over roughly the same period.
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INTRODUCTION
The bizarre end of the Nixon Administration has seemingly closed a
strident period of public struggle over the proper role and direction of
federal court judges, particularly those on the Supreme Court. This
struggle, which centered around the liberal activism of the Warren Court
majority from the middle 1950's to the late 1960's and the conservative
reaction to that activism, has ended, largely because Richard Nixon
appointed four conservatives to the Supreme Court.
As with the previous elections of Andrew Jackson and Franklin
Roosevelt, the election of Nixon engendered the highest hopes and the
deepest despair in those who respectively hated and defended the current
Court and the new President; for Nixon, like his famous predecessors,
explicitly promised new judges and, through them, nav law, although he
simultaneously seemed to disavow judicial policy making.
Public debate over the Court has now subsided largely because the
Supreme Court, led by the four Nixon appointees, has merely refused to
extend Warren Court reforms, thereby avoiding the more ostentatious
reversals of precedents.
Because a conservative revolution on the Court seemed imminent,
scholars carefully monitored the behavior of the Nixon appointees to the
Supreme Court. On the other hand, less attention has been devoted to
assessing the impact of the Nixon appointees to the lower federal courts.
There are probably several reasons for this neglect. For one thing, the
large numbers of judges and cases at those levels prohibits traditional
1
2research involving the reading of judicial opinions. Moreover, comparison
of judicial behavior is very difficult on the lower federal courts as the
judges, for the most part, are deciding different cases. For instance,
district court judges usually sit alone as trial judges, while judges of
the eleven United States Court of Appeals usually decide cases in panels
of three. In only about one percent of their cases do all the appellate
judges of a particular circuit sit en banc. So comparison of judicial
behavior even within a particular circuit must be at best tentative.
This problem of comparability of judicial behavior in the lower courts
also has the effect of inhibiting the use of the newer quantitative
methods such as bloc analysis and scaling which have gained acceptance in
studies of the Supreme Court. Another reason for the neglect of the
lower courts is probably the assumption that cases are less important and
interesting at that level because the lower courts do not exercise the
same degree of control over which cases they hear as does the Supreme
Court. District and Circuit Courts, for the most part, must hear and
decide the cases that are brought to them, while the Supreme Court decides
which case to hear from among many submitted.
Lower courts are probably also neglected because of the limited
impact of any one lower court decision and their perceived lack of impor-
tance. A panel or en banc decision in one circuit, although it may be
persuasive, has no binding effect on other circuits. Normally a decision
by a three judge Courts of Appeals panel is limited to the parties
involved in the particular case, although en banc decisions of the circuit
are expected to control future panel decisions within (but not out of)
the circuit. Supreme Court decisions, on the other hand, are statements
3of law which theoretically bind all officials in the United States. Thus
a broad 'impact" of the Supreme Court decisions is assumed, although many
recent studies have shown that the degree of compliance with Supreme Court
decisions certainly varies.
These are very good reasons for studying the Supreme Court. However,
there are cogent reasons for extending the study of Nixon appointees beyond
the Supreme Court. Obviously, the Supreme Court cannot review every lower
court decision. In fact, according to one scholar, the Supreme Court
reviews and reverses only 1.4 percent of Courts of Appeals' decisions.^
In other words, the decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeals are final
in almost 99 percent of the cases they decide. Although there is little
doubt that most lower court judges are concerned about Supreme Court
review of their decisions, the possibility of Supreme Court reversal is
remote. Moreover, although the cases at the lower court levels are more
routine, some cases do provide opportunities for judicial discretion. Thus
"court packing" could influence case disposition in the lower courts.
That is the problem and the focus of this dissertation: to measure the
Impact, if any, of the Nixon appointees to the lower courts.
Such a study, however, must be carefully limited. For one thing,
the study will concentrate on the one issue, criminal procedures, stressed
in Nixon's 1968 campaign. Criminal procedures cases will be further
limited to just cases involving blue collar crimes because blue collar
cases seem more sharply to divide liberals and conservatives and to serve
^J. Woodford Howard, "Litigation Flow in Three United States
Courts of Appeals," Law and Society Review , VII, No. 1 (fall 1973), p. 44
4as a test of the attitudinal characteristics of the judges. This means
that such white collar crimes as embezzlement, securities act violations,
income tax fraud and selective service violations will be excluded from
the analysis as will such other crimes as bribery, perjury, intoxicated
driving, false statement, flag desecration, and obscenity prosecutions.
Secondly, the study will be limited to the Circuit Courts of Appeals for
the fiscal period 1970 to 1973. Thirdly, quantitative techniques will be
the primary method of analysis. This will involve the assigning of
numerical values to the votes of judges while ignoring their written
explanations of their votes. As Goldman has put it, the cases are viewed
in basic political terms of who wim and who loses and by implication
which broader political and social values are seemingly being fostered.
^
In this particular study, a numerical value of "2" will be assigned to
all pro-defendant votes and a numerical value of "0" to all anti-defendant
votes. In cases where judges grant but also reject important parts of
defendant claims, a numerical value of "1" will be assigned to the votes
of judges favoring that position. Moreover, when judges split three ways
in a non-unanimous decision, a value of "1" will also be assigned to the
middle position.
In ordar to determine the impact of the Nixon appointees on the dis-
position of criminal appeals, an arithmetic mean will be computed for all
the votes cast by Nixon appointees to the Courts of Appeals and this
figure between "0" and "2.00" will be compared with the arithmetic mean
^Sheldon Goldman, "Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of
Appeals Revisited," American Political Science Review , LXIX, No. 2
(June 1975), p. 491.
5of all votes cast by non-Nixon Republicans (primarily Eisenhower appoin-
tees) and non-Nixon Democrats (primarily Kennedy and Johnson appointees).
It is hypothesized that Nixon appointees will have a lower arithmetic
mean, signaling less support for the criminally accused than either of
the other groups.
Because the number of votes cast by individual judges varies from
as few as one to over a hundred in any given term of the court, it is
possible that the disproportionate number of votes cast by only a few
judges in some of the busier circuits could distort the arithmetic mean
as in indicator of the attitudinal characteristics of a judge group. Thus
a median score will also be computed for each of the three judge groups
which will ignore the number of votes cast by individual judges, with
the exception that no judge will be included in the computation who
decides fewer than six non-unanimous or fifteen unanimous cases. It is
hypothesized that Nixon appointees will also have a lower median score
than either of the other judge groups.
The major assumption underlying this study is that attitudinal dif-
ferences of the judges account for differences in support for the crimi-
nally accused, although many of these differences could be explained by
the fact that lower court judges are deciding different cases and deciding
them differently because the nature of the case left them little choice.
One way of minimizing, if not eliminating, this difficulty is to examine
non-unanimous cases separately. It can be assumed with some confidence
that cases producing open dissent among judges do provide them with a
choice. Obviously many unanimously decided cases also provide judges
with a choice, but is is assumed that many also do not. This is
6particularly true in the criminal law field where one appeal, no matter
what its merits, has become almost automatic. Unanimously decided cases
then will be treated apart from, as well as in conjunction with, the non-
unanimous cases. It is expected that the non-unanimous cases, because
they provide more opportunity for discretion, will result in a wider
range of individual and group scores and will serve as better indicators
of judicial values than will the unanimous decisions. On the other hand,
the consideration of both unanimous and non-unanimous decisions combined
is expected to provide the best measure of the actual impact of the
Nixon appointees. It is expected that, although Nixon appointees may
appear more "conservative" on the basis of the non-unanimous decisions,
the impact of appointing a more "conservative" group of judges may be
greatly minimized by the routine (i.e., non-discretionary) nature of many
criminal cases heard by the Courts of Appeals.
With two exceptions, no attempt will be made in this study to
classify and compare cases according to the legal issues involved. These
two exceptions include claims of alleged coerced confessions and illegal
searches and seizures, issues prominently featured in the 1964 and 1968
campaigns of Barry Goldwater and Richard Nixon respectively. Voting in
these types of cases will be compared with voting in an "all other
criminal cases" category. It is expected that Nixon appointees will
differ even more from the other two judge groups on the confession and
search issues than they will on the "all other cases" category, for it is
believed that any screening process by the Nixon Administration would be
particularly concerned with approaches by potential nominees to these
controversial issues. Cases will also be classified according to whether •
7the prosecution oricjin.tod at tho stcte or federal level in order to
control for the possibility that attitudes toward states rights rather
than toward the criminally accused influenced the disposition of criminal
appeals. It is expected that both Nixon appointees and non-Nixon
Republicans will score lower than the Democrats in cases involving state
prosecutions, reflecting the greater concern ol the former groups on
local and state autonomy.
In addition to analyzing the behavior of aggregate judge groups,
the study will also focus on individual circuits in order to determine
how many and which circuits conformed to the hypothesis that Nixon appoin-
tees would be the most conservative group. Only in the fourth and fifth,
the southern circuits, is it expected that non-Nixon Democrats will be
more conservative than Nixon appointees or non-Nixon Republicans. There-
fore, the aggregate analysis already outrinr>d will be done both witfi and
without those circuits included to control for a possible distorting
effect they might have on aggregate totals. This is particularly impor-
tant because of tho l.irge size of the fifth circuit which encompasses
the "deep" South <irid which by itself decides ncdr]y a third of all
criminal cases heard by tfie United States Courts of Appeals.
Although there is little reason to conclude that cases are more
comparable witfiin than b(>tween circuits, intra-circuit analysis does have
the advantage of Including cases in which judges sit together. This
situation makes it possible to compute the percentage of the time a pair
of judges hearing the same cases agree witfi one anotfier, a form of an.ilysis
usually known as bloc analysis. Through bloc analysis it can be determined
wh(,'tfier, for instance, Nixon appointees tend to agree more readily with
8other Nixon appointees or with non-Nixon Republicans and Democrats.
Thus the degree of attitudinal cohesiveness of Nixon appointees in a
particular circuit can be estimated. If this cohesiveness is lacking
in certain circuits where bloc analysis is possible, or if Nixon
appointees score higher in criminal cases than either or both other
judge groups in certain circuits, it may be assumed that the Nixon
Administration met and failed to overcome certain obstacles in their
attempt to "pack" that particular circuit. One such potential obstacle
is the custom of Senatorial courtesy whereby the Senator of the Presi-
dent's party from a potential nominee's home state may single-handedly
veto Presidential appointments to the judiciary at the District and
Circuit Court levels. In order to test the potency of this variable in
explaining possible variations in the voting behavior of Nixon appoin-
tees, scores of these appointees will be compared with Senate A.D.A.
scores of their sponsoring Republican Senator (where one exists) to see
if there is a correlation between the two.
Finally, this study will include two other aspects designed to
measure the character of Nixon appointees to the Courts of Appeals.
First, Nixon appointees will be compared with the other two judge groups
while holding the age and religious affiliation of the judges constant.
These other variables have been found, in another study, to be related
in a statistically significant way to voting in criminal cases. And,
secondly, the study will also examine the written opinions of appellate
court judges in confession cases to see if quantitative findings of
3lbid., p. 501.
9attitudinal similarity or dissimilarity are supported by similarity or
dissimilarity in the doctrinal positions taken by judges on this key
issue. The chapter outline into which the previously discussed aspects
of the study are organized follows below.
Chapter K_ The first chapter will attempt to place the Nixon
campaign against the court system in an historical context by comparing
it with past campaign attempts to alter judicial policy and/or institu-
tions to determine as much as possible the intentions of the Nixon
Administration toward its judicial appointments.
Chapter II. The second chapter will discuss the politics of the
judicial selection process by reviewing recent literature on the subject
and will offer a brief socio-political profile of Nixon appointees, non-
Nixon Democrats and non-Nixon Republicans to determine the potential of
and limits on judicial selection as an instrument for changing court
pol icy.
Chapter III. The third chapter will try to assess the impact of
the Nixon appointments through a quantitative analysis of the voting
behavior of the judges of the United States Courts of Appeals in criminal
cases decided in fiscal 1973. This analysis will include both unanimous
and non-unanimous cases.
Chapter IV. The fourth chapter will attempt to identify the
attitudinal characteristics of the three-judge groups by focusing only
on non-unanimously decided criminal cases for the four-year period fiscal
1970-73. This quantitative analysis will include the bloc analysis of
voting behavior in each circuit and the analysis of the relationship
between voting behavior and selected socio-political background
10
characteristics of the judges and the correlation analysis of the voting
behavior of Nixon appointees and their sponsoring Republican Senators.
Chapter V, The fifth chapter will involve a qualitative analysis
of coerced confession cases decided in the Courts of Appeals during
fiscal 1973. Doctrinal positions taken by Nixon appointees on these
issues will be compared with doctrinal issues taken by non-Nixon appoin-
tees to see how much these positions varied within and between groups.
Chapter VL_ Finally, Chapter VI will summarize and attempt to
explain the major findings, comment on the assumptions underlying the
research, and suggest other research possibilities uncovered by this
study.
CHAPTER I
THE NIXON. CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE COURT:
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Attacks on the wisdom and even the integrity of the federal courts
have been frequent in American history. This is understandable for the
federal courts in exercising their almost unique powers of judicial
review have been embroiled in intense political controversies from the
beginnings of the Republic to the present dayJ In addition, the
Constitutional provision for separation of powers is designed to produce
recurring confrontation between semi-independent branches of government.
Struggle and tension then are inherent features in a political system
of this design. At the same time, the federal courts are dependent on
the President and the Congress to appoint their judges, provide their
funds, and determine their size, jurisdiction and structure. The federal
courts are thus potentially vulnerable to their coordinate branches of
government which possess the formal power to significantly alter not
only their policy direction but their role and stature in the political
system as well. Thus our federal courts lack the complete independence
^Charles Warren, The Suprema Court in United States History
,
(Boston: Little Brown, 1926). Of several excellent histories. Warren's
is particularly sensitive to the political controversies that have
swirled around the court.
2
James Madison (probably). Federal ist no 51, in Hillman Bishop
and Samuel Hendel , Basic Issues in American Democracy (7th ed.. New York:
Appelton, Century, Crofts, 1973), p. 43.
n
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that life tenure supposedly provides^ and our history is replete with
instances of "court curbings" and "court packings" that have influenced
4judicial policy.
Probably the principal protection for the courts against such
onslaughts by their coordinate branches is the widely held public expecta-
tion that the courts should be subject to influence only through the
appointment of new judges as vacancies occur. ^ Thus the appointment
power has been a principal means of effecting constitutional change.
Traditionally, the President has appointed his own partisans to
judicial vacancies roughly ninety percent of the time.^ Thus it is under-
standable that changes in political power are often accompanied by what
appear to be threats to the courts or to the policies they represent as
"^Robert Dahl
, "Decision Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court
as a National Policy Maker," Journal of Public Law
,
VI, No. 2 (1957),
pp. 279-295. Dahl effectively refutes the notion that, historically,
the Supreme Court has significantly protected minority rights against
majority action. Instead, he argues that the Court, with few exceptions,
has followed the election returns and served to legitimize the dominant
political coalition in the country. Dahl, of course, wrote before the
Warren Court of the 1960s dramatically expanded civil rights and civil
liberties. The Warren Court experience does not necessarily refute the
Dahl thesis, but see Jonathan A. Casper, "The Supreme Court and National
Policy Making," American Political Science Review , 70 (1976), in press.
^See generally VJalter Murphy, Congress and the Supreme Court
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962') and Robert Steamer, The
Supreme Court in Crisis (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press,
T97TT:
5
This distinction between legitimate and illegitimate attempts to
influence the Court has been drawn by C. H. Pritchett, Congress Versus
The Supreme Court (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), p. 119.
^Joel Grossman, Lawyers and Judges: The American Bar Association
and the Politics of Judicial Selection (New York: John Wiley and Son,
1965), p. 216. Grossman documents this point with regard to the Supreme
Court. The figures for the lower federal courts are presented in 20
Congressional Quarterly (1962), p. 1175.
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those new in power begin to alter court membership and, frequently, court
pol icies.
Patronage is one reason for continuing partisanship in judicial
Selection. Federal judgeships have been virtually the most prized jobs in
government because of high pay, prestige, and secure tenure.^ The party
in power then is anxious to award these positions to their "faithful."
Policy though is the major source of controversy over judicial
appointments. The policy making functions of the federal courts have
been apparent to interested partisans at least since the Marbury case,^
but it has been mainly in this century that the intellectual community,
including some of the judges, began to disabuse themselves and others of
the notion that judges do not make law. Now the distance between the
way judges have acted and what academicians, the legal commurii ty, and the
general public would admit about them has narrowed. During the Senate
struggle over the G. Harrold Carswell nomination to the Supreme Court,
Yale Law School professor Charles L. Black contended that United States
Senators could legitimately weigh a judicial nominee's attitudes toward
key public policy issues, in this case civil rights.^ Apparently Black's
1
0
argument was influential in the confirmation proceedings. Similarly,
political scientist Joel Grossman has defended partisan (i.e., on the
^Harold Chase, Federal Judges: The Appointing Process (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1972), p. 29.
^Marbury v. Madison 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
^C. L. Black, "A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court
Nominees," Yale Law Journal , LXXVX, No. 1 (November, 1969), p. 650.
^^Richard Harris, Decision (New York: E. F. Dutton and Company,
1971), pp. 94-96.
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basis of party affiliation) judicial selection, particularly for the
lower federal courts, because this allows, he asserts, a rough estimate
of the potential behavior of nominees to those courts J
^
This scholarly "sophistication" about the sources of judicial
behavior is also apparent in the public press, the campaign rhetoric of
politicians (as shown later), and the views of the general public. A
^^'^S'^^^k article by Stewart Alsop claimed that policy views were the real
sources of contention over the Abe Fortas, Clement Haynsworth, and
Harrold Carswell nominations to the Supreme Court, as well as with most
other high court appointments J ^ And academicians Walter Murphy and
Joseph Tanenhaus, who studied public reaction to Senator Goldwater's
1964 anti-Court campaign, said they "...would not have anticipated that
theacademic debate about neutral principles of constitutional law would
have trickled down through all levels of society. . ."^^
That judges make law has become almost a dogma then in the popular
culture as well as in intellectual discourse. However, the "discovery"
of the political nature of the court has been magnified in this century,
first by the Court's obstruction of liberal economic measures arising out
of the progressive era and the New Deal and later by its championing of
civil rights and liberties other than property rights. These Court
policies, like others in the more distant past, have engendered a storm
^^Grossman, Op. cit.
, p. 219.
1
2
Stewart Alsop, "The Myth and William Rehnquist," Newsweek
(December 6, 1971), p. 124.
^
^Walter Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, "Public Opinion and the
Supreme Court: The Goldwater Campaign," Public Opinion Quarterly , XXXXII
(Spring 1968), p. 48.
15
of controversy^^ provoking campaign attacks from Progressive LaFollette,
Republicans Goldwater and Nixon, and American Party candidate Wallace.
In the present era, Nixon, Goldwater, and Wallace seemed most
concerned with the Warren Court's expansive interpretation of the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly as these constitutional
provisions were applied to limit the powers of various state governments
to regulate race relations, to cope with problems of lawlessness, to elect
their officials to state and county governments, to outlaw obscenity, and
to curb radical political dissenters.""^ In part, the Nixon campaign
reflected the Eisenhower Administration's concern over the liberal trend of
criminal justice decisions by the federal courts and the liberal tenden-
cies of federal judges (eighty percent of whom were Democrats when the
Republican Party regained thp Presidency in igR?)^^ in this policy area.
Thus Republican concern was apparent long before the Warren Court decisions
of the 1960s "revolutionized" the administration of criminal justice,^''
and can be traced back to Republican Congressional hostility to the
Supreme Court's 1943 decision McNabb v. United States
. Eisenhower,
14
Of course scholarly revelations about the political character of
court action may have contributed to the controversy over the court's
modern role.
1
5
An excellent review of the Warren Court's civil liberties decisions
can be found in Henry Abraham's Freedom and the Court (2nd ed.; New York:
Oxford University Press, 1972).
^^Chase, op. cit ., pp. 94 and 102.
Ibid .
""^McNabb v. United States 318 U.S. 332 (1943). An early confession
case involving a delay in arraignment prior to police questioning. The
Supreme Court nullified the conviction without ruling that the confession
was involuntary. To be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
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however, avoided commenting on any decisions of the Supreme Court, led by
his appointee Chief Justice Earl Warren; and Nixon, then Vice President,
on one occasion, following the Court's decision in Brown v. The Board of
Education
,
praised "the great Republican Chief Justice. "''^
Following dramatic court decisions early in the 1960s on reappor-
tionment, prayer in public schools, and as already mentioned, criminal
procedures, opposition to the Court reached a shrill crescendo; and the
1964 Republican Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater peppered his
campaign with critical references to the Court. Goldwater and his anti-
court campaign were, however, overwhelmed by the "finger cn the nuclear
button" and economic welfare issues, and ihe conservatives lost their
chance to "turn the court around. "^^ Subsequent to that election.
President Lyndon Johnson's Supreme Court appointments of liberals
Abe Fortas and Thurgood Marshall, and his abortive attempted elevation of
Fortas to the Chief Justiceship and friend Homer Thornberry to an Associate
Justiceship, increased conservative fears over the future policy direc-
tions of the Court and the intentions of the Democratic Administration
in that regard.
Meanwhile, coupled with court decisions which in the eyes of some
seemed to undermine religion, encourage the breakdown of traditional
sexual morality, free known criminals, aid and abet communists, and mix
the races, there was an alarming rise in the crime rate, up 120 percent
^^New York Times , Feb. 14, 1956, p. 18.
on
Murphy and Tanenhaus, loc. cit.
^^Theodore White, The Making of the President 1964 (New York:
Antheneum, 1965).
17
from 1950 to 1968, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
uniform crime reports. Although statistics are suspect in this field
due to problems of record keeping and crime reporting (by victims), crime
and political dissent had, in the 1960s, dramatically coalesced in the
nation's major cities and particularly its capital where race riots and
political demonstrations were often accompanied by looting and vandalism.
Crime was thus televised and dramatized, and a perceived breakdown in
public order and private morality became the principal domestic theme of
Richard Nixon's successful 1968 campaign for the Presidency. Because
this campaign directly relates to the purposes of this dissertation, it
is useful to discuss it in some detail.
The 1968 Nixon Campaign
When in August of 1968 Richard Nixon accepted the Republican Party's
nomination for the Presidency of the United States, he summed up eight
months of campaigning for the nomination and previewed the subsequent
election campaign:
Let us always respect.
. . our courts and those who serve on them,
but let us also recognize that some of our courts in their
decisions have gone too far in weakening the peace forces as
against the criminal forces in this country. . .
Let our judges who have the responsibility to interpret our
laws be dedicated to the great principles of civil rights,
but let them also recognize that the first civil right of
every American is to be free from domestic violence. And that
right must be guaranteed in this country. 24
22
Crime and the Law, Congressional Quarterly (Washington, D. C,
1971), p. 5.
0-3
Theodore White, The Making of the President 1968 (New York:
Atheneum, 1969). See generally Chapter 11
^^New York Times, August 9, 1968, p. 1.
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In March, the candidate had pledged, if elected, to modify three
Supreme Court decisions which had broadened the procedural rights of
criminal defendants, although he did not identify the decisions.^' In
May, he partially blamed Supreme Court decisions Escobedo v. Illinois
and Miranda v. Arizona for an eighty-eight percent crime increase since
1960.^^
After the Miami Convention, ostensibly responding to advice from
Republican Senator Edward Brooke of Massachusetts, Mr. Nixon refrained
from criticizing specific court decisions. Thereafter he attacked the
27
courts in more general terms. In early October, over national tele-
vision, he asserted that the Supreme Court had "injected social and
economic ideas into their opinions." He promised therefore to appoint
judges who would interpret the Constitution "strictly and fairly. "^^
Three days before the election he told a nationwide radio audience that
members of the Supreme Court ware unfamiliar with criminal justice. He
pledged to appoint as judges men with experience or great knowledge in
the field of criminal justice, who recognize that the "abused deserve as
on
much protection as the accused."
Campaign criticisms of the federal courts by major Presidential
contenders are rare. In the nineteenth century the courts became an
^^ Ibid
.
, March 11, 1968, p. 33.
^^
Ibid ., March 9, 1968, p. 1.
^^
Ibid
. ,
September 8, 1958, p. 78.
^^Ibid., October 4, 1968, p. 50.
29 Ibid., November 3, 1968, p. 79,
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issue only in the election of 1850 as the Republicans responded to Dred
Scott V. Sanford^O and in 1895 when the Populists, angered by monopoly,
income tax, and injunction decisions, included an anti-Court plank in
^their platform.^^ In this cent.ry, other than Nixon, only LaFollette
(1924) and Wallace (1968) have made the Court a significant campaign
issue. None of the latter three appealed successfully to the voters,
Wallace receiving 13.4 percent of the vote, LaFollette 16.5 percent, and
Goldwater roughly 39 percent. Even Nixon received a plurality of only
43.2 percent although the "harder line" on law and order represented by
Nixon and Wallace campaigns attracted, in the 1958 election, roughly
56 percent of the popular vote, a mandate of sorts for the appointment of
strict constructionist judges, knowledgeable about criminal justice and
sympathetic to "the peace forces as opposed to the criminal forces."
Of the four contenders in this century, Nixon's campaign most
resembled Senator Goldwater's in 1964. Goldwater tied Supreme Court
decisions, specifically Mai lory v. United States and Mapp v Ohio
, to the
rising crime rate and pledged to work to overturn by Congressional
action and constitutional amendment these and other Supreme Court decisions
which had favored excessively the rights of defendants in criminal prosecu-
tions. He also pledged to use his appointment power to "redress consti-
tutional interpretation in favor of the public. "^^
In contrast, the Progressive Party platform of 1924 promised to make
30
Kirk Porter and Donald Johnson, National Party Platforms 1840 -
1968 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), p. 2.
31
Murphy, Op. cit.
, pp. 44-45.
^^New York Times, September 15, 1964, pp. 1 S 12.
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an federal judgeships elective for ten-year terms and to authorize Con-
gress to override Supreme Court decisions. Similarly George Wallace,
the American Party candidate of 1968, called for elected federal district
court judges and Senate reconfirmation of Supreme Court judges after an
-3/1
unstated period.
Thus the Nixon campaign on the court issue cut a middle course
between the more extreme institutional "reforms" of Wallace and the
limited support for the Court offered by the Democratic candidate
Hubert Humphrey. ^5 Republican Vice Presidential candidate Spiro Agnew
attempted to distinguish his party's views on law and order from Wallace's
He charged Wallace with using the law and order issue as a "hatchet" and
attempted to tie law and order to social progress. R. B. Semple, com-
menting on Nixon's presentation of the crime issue t.o thp Rppuhlican
platform committee at the convention, saw the candidate's "militance" on
law and order as designed to "head off Wallace in the border states, stem
fellow Republican contender Reagan's inroads into the south, and free
himself for a more liberal foreign policy position."
Nor did candidate Nixon appear to depart from public opinion in his
court criticism. In a March 1968 Gallup Poll, the Gallup organization
found that sixty-three percent of Americans surveyed believed that the
33
Porter and Johnson, Op. cit.
, pp. 252-254.
^^ Ibid
. , pp. 702-705.
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Humphrey s position will be elaborated upon later in the chapter.
New York Times , September 5, 1968, p. 40.
37lb1d.
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r;"^^^
""^-^^^^
------- we.
t^e Co..t was ^Won,. on t.e co.cea confession cases.38
,,,3
^amp
.eported a
.ec,1„e 1n attU..es favo.a.le to Court f.o. fori,-
five percent favorable in July 1967 to th.Vf. •'y 'yb/, thirty-six percent favorable in
percent of the northerners and Democrats
.e,d unfavorable attitudes toward
the court and Indicated that the anti-Court i.pulse was even stronger
a.o„g southerners and Repub, icans.^0 3,.^,^
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^
^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
a non-partisan
.ethod of Judicial selection.^^ A
.onth later, in August
Gallup reported that cri.e was perceived as the top problem in the country
by twenty-eight percent of the respondents as compared with thirteen per-
cent Who Singled out race relations and fifty-two percent who indicated
the Vietnan War as the most pressing national problem. Cri.e had hardly
been mentioned in a 1966 survey in which the Vietnam War. racial strife,
and living costs had been of greatest public concern. In the three-monih
period between May and August of 1968 those perceiving crime as the major
issue had increased from fifteen to twenty-eight percent.''^
Two September polls by Louis Harris and Associates replicated the
Gallup organization's findings concerning the public mood. Harris reported
38
Ibrd.
,
March 3, 1968, p. 40.
39
Ibid.
,
July 10, 1968, p. 19.
^hbid.
^^Ibid.
, August 4, 1968, p. 45.
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that eighty-one percent of his respondents agreed that "law and order had
broken down in the country," and that eighty-four percent believed a "strong
President co.ld make a difference" although the Supreme Court was not
mentioned by respondents as a cause of crime. A later Harris poll
reported that thirty-eight percent felt Nixon could best handle the law
and order problem; Humphrey drew the support of twenty-six percent and
Wallace was endorsed by twenty-one percent."^"^ In the same poll, Harris also
found that respondents rejected by fifty-eight percent to twenty-two per-
cent the statement that "politicians for law and order were against
progress and negroes." Sixty-three percent agreed that there could not
be law and order unless there was justice for minorities.
By thus stressing law and order while occasionally mentioning
justice and progress, the Nixon campaign harmonized with public concern
over crime, public dissatisfaction with the courts and a degree of public
sophistication with regard to the social causes of lawlessness. Whether
the Nixon campaign or that of other candidates contributed to that opinion
AC
swing or merely mirrored it has not been determined.
But if the Republican candidate was in accord with views expressed
by the general public, he was not as attuned to the views of many in his
^^Ibid.
,
September 10, 1968, p. 31.
44
Ibid
. ,
September 13, 1958, p. 52.
^^
Ibid
. ,
September 10, 1968, p. 31.
4fi
Murphy and Tanenhaus, Op. cit.
, p. 47. In their study of the
1964 campaign the authors concluded that "Goldwater's complaints about
the court decisions on . . . the rights of criminal defendants could
not possibly have had a great impact on public opinion. There was simply
little reaction to these rulings."
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party in Congress. The positions of these Congressional Republicans can
add another perspective to his campaign. C. Herman Pritchett and
Walter Murphy both wrote books on the vituperative "court curbing" acti-
vities of Republican Congressmen during the eighty-fifth Congress (1958).
Probably the best known "court curbing" proposal during this session was
the Jenner-Butler bill designed to restrict appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in areas where the court had made controversial decisions.
In addition, fourteen other bills were introduced designed to alter in
some way the process of choosing the judges themselves .^^ Pritchett and
Murphy agreed that the Republican Party in Congress was virtually unani-
mous in support of "court curbing" just as Democrats outside the South
were almost unanimously against it. Not only were Republicans in the
Congress widely separated from non-southern Democrats on the court issue,
they were also in disagreement with the Republican administration of
which former Congressman Nixon was the Vice President. Pritchett
reported that only thirty of one hundred and forty-four Republicans in
the House supported President Eisenhower on the Jenner-Butler Bill.^^ He
credits Vice President Nixon with a key procedural ruling which made
adjournment possible without the adoption of a single one of the bills,
despite the fact that there was probably a Senate majority for some of
50
the proposals. These Republican Congressmen were a part of the same
'^^Grossman, Op. cit.
, p. 216.
Ibid .
^^Pritchett, Op. cit. , pp. 127-128,
^^Ibid., p. 11.
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anti-court faction that Murphy and Tanenhaus claim Goldwater "mobilized,
articulated and legitimized" in 1964. Significantly neither President
Eisenhower nor Vice President Nixon were identified with that faction in
1958. Ten years later candidate Nixon still had not become a "court
curber" in the sense of advocating insitutional changes.
Democrats skirted the court issue in 1964 and 1968. President Lyndon
Johnson claimed that the court "was not an appropriate election issue,
Hubert Humphrey, in his acceptance speech for the 1968 Presidential nomina-
tion, weakly responded to the Nixon campaign that "the answer ... to the
law and order problem
. . . does not lie in an attack on our courts, our
laws, or our Attorney General, "^^ but he offered no positive defense of
court policies. In Congress, some northern liberals supported the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act which had hit at Miranda v. Arizona,
Wade V. United States (requiring counsel at policy "line ups"), and
Mai lory v. United States (a controversial 1957 confession case); so effec-
tive northern Democratic support for Court policy appears to have eroded
in the decade following the 1958 battles.
From either a more distant perspective or in the political context of
his own time, Richard Nixon's assault on the federal courts does not appear
^hbid
., pp. 123-124.
^^Murphy and Tanenhaus, Op. cit. , 33-34.
CO
Hubert Humphrey, "Address to the Democratic National Convention,"
Vital Speeches
,
XXXIV, No. 22 (September 1968), p. 708.
^"^Harris, Op. cit. , p. 172. Subsequently northern liberals supported
President Nixon's crime package including preventive detention. Harris
comments that these Senators "rational ized. .. (about this support).. as the
need for progressives to take the lead in this area and the need to rid
the streets of fear before constructive approaches could be taken."
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to have been a radical departure from American political tradition or
popular opinion, but rather to have been imbedded within it. If the
Nixon campaign was not unique, however, his victory was, for by winning
the 1968 election he became the first successful Presidential candidate
to promise to change judicial policy on a specific issue. Thus the
Nixon victory offers an exceptional opportunity to inquire into the
potential of and limits on a national political movement frankly
attempting to change federal judicial policy through the appointment
56
process. This inquiry will begin by examining, in the next chapter,
literature concerning the judicial selection process.
55
Fred Graham, The Self-Inflicted Wound (New York: MacMillan Co.,
1970), p. 306. Such notable court opponents as Andrew Jackson and
Franklin Roosevelt did not make court policy an election issue. Jackson'
numerous appointment opportunities made dramatic assaults unnecessary
and Roosevelt saved his infamous court "reform" bill for Congress.
However, 1936 was a referendum on the New Deal and in a broad sense,
opposition to the New Deal from conservative Justices of the Supreme
Court was an issue.
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It is of course clear by now that criminal issues sharply divide
the Nixon four from the rest of the Supreme Court and particularly from
liberals Brennan, Marshall and Douglas. Only Byron White frequently
agrees with Nixon's appointees and these five, sometimes joined by
Stewart, have accomplished something of a constitutional revolution of
their own with regard to the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments to the
Constitution, although they have avoided the ostentatious overruling of
precedent so common during the Warren Court era. See particularly
Leonard Levy's Against the Law (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).
CHAPTER II
THE SELECTION AND SOCIO-POLITICAL BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF
APPEALS: EISENHOWER TO NIXON
As the last chapter indicates, candidate Richard Nixon clearly and
repeatedly stated that, if elected, he would appoint "law and order"
judges to the federal courts. Four years later, as President, Nixon
acknowledged that pledge and offered his own general assessment of his
judicial appointments of the previous four years.
I promised that I would appoint judges to the federal courts
and particularly the Supreme Court who would recognize that
the first civil right of every American is to be free from
domestic violence.
I am proud of the appointments I have made to the courts
and particularly proud of those I have made to the Supreme
Court of the United States.'
Nixon had reason to be proud of his Supreme Court appointments,
for in the face of the most stubborn Senatorial opposition to Presiden-
tial court nominations in this century, he had succeeded in placing four
judicial "conservatives" on the high Court.
It is not clear from this statement, however, whether Nixon was less
proud of his lower court appointments or merely unaware of or unconcerned
with their performance. Perhaps though his statement reflects his
^New York Times, August 24, 1972, P- ^7.
^Prior to the Senate's rejection of both Clement Haynsworth and
G. Harrold Carswell and the 1968 proposed elevation of Abe Fortas to the
Chief Justiceship, only 1930 Hoover nominee, John Parker, failed to gain
Senate confirmation in this century.
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awareness of the declining power and involvement of the President person-
ally in the selection process at the lower levels of the federal
judiciary.
One of the ironies of the judicial selection process it seems is
that the Senate Judiciary Committee and sometimes the Senate as a whole,
make a genuine effort to investigate and sometimes to challenge Presiden-
tial appointments to the Supreme Court but with only rare exceptions,
not to the lower federal courts, ^ yet the President is perhaps more likely
to get his way with the Supreme Court than with the district and circuit
courts, where the choices of individual Senators may prevail. This is
probably due to a number of factors including the perceived lack of impor-
tance of lower courts by both President and Senators, the unwillingness of
either institution to devote significant resources to lower court appoint-
ments and consequently the growth of unwritten rules which assign the
lower court appointment prerogative to individual Senators.^ A further
irony is that Presidents may find that they have greater freedom of choice'
at the lower court level when facing a hostile Congress dominated by the
opposition party because real Congressional veto power over judicial
appointments is lodged in the hands of individual Senators of the Presi-
dent's party--the fewer of these Senators the President must contend with
3
Joel Grossinan, Lawyers and Judges: The A.B.A. and the Politics
of Judicial Selection
,
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp.
170-1.
^Ibid.
, p. 122.
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the greater his latitude in making lower court appointments.^
Despite formidable constraints on the President's appointment
power at the lower levels of the federal judiciary, there is no reason to
cbnclude that the executive branch has little influence on their selec-
tion. The thrust of recent studies by Chase, ^ Goldman, 7 and Grossman,^
among others, is that the Justice Department, and particularly the
Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General, play a positive and perhaps
dominant part in the selection of lower federal judges, particularly those
to the circuit courts.^
Typically, argues Goldman, appointing administrations face two
types of situations: (1) where one or both Senators from the state from
which the appointee will be selected belong to the President's party; and
(2) where both Senators belong to the opposition party. In the latter
situation, "justice officials can select their own candidate and can
ordinarily secure 'clearance' for that candidate. "^^ In the first situation
^For example, Kennedy was able to appoint eight judges in New York
without Senatorial consultation, acceding only to the wishes of Democratic
House Judiciary Committee chairman Emmanuel Cellar on one nominee. See
Victor iiavasky, Kennedy Justice (New York: Athenium, 1971), p. 264. By
contrast, Nixon was forced to delay some appointments in the second
circuit for over two years because of inability to reach agreement with
Republican Senator Jacob Javits.
Harold Chase, Federal Judges: The Appointing Process
,
(Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1972).
7
Sheldon Goldman, "Judicial Appointments to the United States Courts
of Appeals," Wisconsin Law Review , LXVII, no. 1 (Winter, 1967), pp. 186-214.
o
Grossman, Lo c. Cit.
^ Ibid ., p. 122.
"•^Goldman, Loc. Cit. , p. 213.
29
where Senatorial courtesy may be invoked, the administration has several
options for securing appointments over the opposition of an in-party
Senator: It may avoid the invocation of courtesy by appointing its man
to a judgeship outside the recalcitrant Senator's state or region, for
instance to a judgeship in the Washington, D. C. circuit. Or it may
appoint judges to recess appointments which do not require confirmation,
and then use the judge's record of successful interim service to lobby
for Senate confirmation to a life term. Or it may delay appointing any-
one at all to vacant judicial posts and rely on an accumulation of
pressures from local press and bar associations to force Senatorial
compromise.''^ Or it may arrange "package deals" to secure the appoint-
ment of preferred candidates.
In effect, writes Grossman, the appointing administration "occupies
a controlling position" in the selection of lower federal court judges.
Ehe Attorney GeneraTI may not be able to engineer a nomination
over the adamant opposition of an "in-party" Senator, but. ..he
can generate sufficient pressure on a Senator to achieve a
workable compromise.
. .Sometimes the price will be prohibitive
and he will have to approve a nomination that he dislikes. But
he cannot afford to have such instances be more than exceptions. ^'^
^
"I flew York Times
,
Feb. 7, 1971, p. 69. According to the Times
the Nixon Administration delayed for two years the appointment of
judges to some vacancies on the second circuit because of its
inability to reach an accord with Jacob davits, the liberal Republican
Senator from Mew York.
'Chase, loc. cit. Chase discussed administration options in
some detail in part I of his book.
13Grossman, Op. cit. , p. 122,
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The Role of the American Bar Association
One impetus for a positive administration role in the appointment
process other than its own policy or patronage interests, is the active,
critical role of the American Bar Association's Committee on Federal
Judiciary which has in recent years exercised a quasi-official role in
the initial investigatory stages of the selection process. By screening
potential nominees and passing on their qualifications, the American
Bar Association is both a goad to an administration that wishes to avoid
adverse publicity on the quality of its appointments, and also a
potential source of leverage and support for administrations in conflict
with Senators from their own party J
^
The A.B.A. is also a potential source of trouble for administra-
tions with distinct policy and patronage interests. The political and
philosophical leanings of the A.B.A. toward the Republican Party are well
known, ""^ and it was during the Eisenhower Presidency that the Committee
on Federal Judiciary of the A.B.A. first attained a secure role in the
selection process, exercising an informal veto over lower court nomina-
tions and securing an election pledge from 1960 Presidential candidate
Nixon to implement "non-partisan" judicial selection.^'' The Democrats,
on the other hand, could never appear to be "captive" of the A.B.A., and
both Kennedy and Johnson refused to grant a veto power to the A.B.A. or
^
^Ibid
., p. 80.
^^ Ibid .
^^ Ibid
., p. 80.
^^Ibid.
, pp. 77-8.
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pledge themselves to bipartisan or non-partisan judicial selection.^^
However, Democrats have utilized the investigatory, advisory and publicity
functions of the A.B.A.
President-elect Nixon's relationship with the A.B.A. was marked by
ambivalence. Nixon became the first President to declare publicly that
he would not appoint a lower court judge who had been deemed unqualified
by the A.B.A., 19 then refused to submit the names of Supreme Court
nominees for even preliminary screening after the A.B.A. "shot down" his
prospective nominations of Mildred Lilly, Richard Poff, and Herschel Friday
prior to the eventual naming of Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist.^^
Factors influencing administration choices
. Given the relative
freedom of choice, which is even more pronounced with circuit than with
district judges, what factors influence the President's choices of lower
court judges? More specifically, of what importance are questions of the
judge's ideological and policy viewpoints on his eventual selection?
Goldman's study of Eisenhower and Kennedy appointments led him to
conclude that considerations of "quasi-ideology" came into play along with
considerations of strengthening a circuit, making party leaders happy, and
legal competence. However, political rather than legal or ideological
factors seemed most important:
On balance it seems that the candidate^ quasi-ideological view-
point or his position on specific policy areas occasionally plays
a decisive role in the appointment process... it is probably an
inarticulate force operating to favor 'our kind,' other things
^^Chase, Op. cit.
, p. 74.
^^New York Times , February 7, 1972, p. 69.
^^Elizabeth Drew, "The Nixon Court," Atlantic , CCXXX, no. 5,
(November, 1972), p. 10.
32
being equal. However, because quasi-ideology and specific
policy areas... do not usually explicitly concern the poli-
tical actors involved in the process, quasi-ideology and
specific policy views are not pronounced features of the
selection process.^'
However, both Goldman and Chase, who had access to Justice Depart-
ment files, found evidence that the Kennedy and Eisenhower Administra-
tions had checked the policy views of candidates on specific issues in
addition to "our kind" considerations of a general conservative or
liberal orientation. The Eisenhower Administration was particularly
alert to the law and order views of specific nominees and were "apparently
seeking to pick men who took a jaundiced view of the Supreme Court's
decisions in that field, particularly the decision in the Mallory case..."^^
Similarly, Goldman found the Kennedy Administration officials had checked
the racial segregation views of all six of its nominees to the southern
(fifth) circuit.
Apparently the Law and order views of judges were a concern of both
the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations, but this and the check on
racial views in the Kennedy era were exceptions. According to Goldman,
the Justice Department has organizational needs that would lead it to
avoid those potential nominees with an anti-prosecution bias. This
^^Goldman, Op. cit.
, p. 211.
^^chase, Op. cit., pp. 104-5.
Goldman, O p. cit. , pp. 210-11. Navasky offers an excellent
account of how the Kennedy Administration, through inexperience, faulty
intelligence, and the politics of the judicial selection process, came
to appoint five fervent segregationists to district and circuit
judgeships in the South at a time when the Justice Department was
committed to promoting civil rights through litigation. See Victor
Navasky, Op. cit ., Chapter V.
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presents few problems to a "right of rpntor" .An.^ • .f yni: T ce e administration such as that
of Eisenhower or Nixon, but an internal schism in "left of center-
administrations such as Kennedy's or Johnson's. 24
This is not to suggest that policy views of prospective nominees
were the decisive factor in their eventual selection. Goldman's compari-
son of the voting behavior of Kennedy and Eisenhower nominees on criminal
procedures issues revealed no statistically significant differences
between the two groups. ^5 Moreover, Kennedy appointees to the southern
circuit were generally very conservative on racial issues despite the
administration's check on their views.
Nevertheless, the Nixon Administration professed a singular deter-
mination to change court policy on the law and order issues. No scholar has
yet published research on judicial selection during the Nixon Administra-
tion based on access to Justice Department files. However, it would appear
from the studies already done of the powers and limitations of appoint-
ing administrations that a sufficiently determined administration could
secure the appointment of particular ideological types to the lower
courts and block others. jhus Nixon's 1972 convention statement
remains somewhat of a mystery. Was he less than pleased with his lower
court appointments? Were policy views and ideological considerations
Ibid . 209-10.
25Sheldon Goldman, "Voting Behavior on the United States Courts
of Appeals, 1961-64," American Political Science Review, LX, no. 2,
(June, 1966), p. 381. ~
"
New York Times
,
February 7, 1971, p. 69. According to the
New Yo rk Times
,
the Nixon Administration rejected liberal New Jersey
Senator Clifford Case's nomination to the third circuit of aide
Clyde Ferguson, a black, because the latter was "soft" on crime.
34
a significant aspect of the appointment process for the lower courts
during Nixon's term of office? Did his appointees perform unexpectedly
once on the courts?
Chase, whose research into judicial selection did not include the
Nixon Administration, wrote that
...the dynamics of judicial selection are such that
administrations which are basically concerned with making
appointments of high quality will choose the same kinds of
people for the same kinds of reasons whatever goals and
standards they articulate. .. "2/
Two sources of information as to whether or not Nixon varied considerably
from the appointment practices of his predecessors would lie in the
voting behavior of his appointees on the bench and in their biographical
characteristics. The remainder of this chapter will focus on the bio-
graphical characteristics of Nixon appointees. Succeeding chapters will
focus on their actual behavior.
Background characteristics of United States Circuit Court judges:
Eisenhower to Nixon. Goldman has been the most assiduous collector of
biographical information concerning United States Circuit Court judges.
This information has been published in two articles comparing first the
Eisenhower and Kennedy appointments to the Courts of Appeals, *^ and
00
second, the Johnson and Nixon appointees to those courts. As the
^hhase. Op. cit.
, p. 185.
Sheldon Goldman, "Characteristics of Eisenhower and Kennedy
Appointments to the Lower Federal Courts," in Sheldon Goldman and
Thomas Jahnige, The Federal Judicial System , (New York: Holt, Rinehart,
and Winston, 1969), pp. 25-30.
^^Sheldcn Goldman, "Johnson and Nixon Appointees to the Lower
Federal Courts: Some Socio-Pol i tical Perspectives," Journal o f
Politics
,
XXXIV, no. 2 (1972), pp. 934-942.
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Eisenhower appointees exhaust the bulk of non-Nixon Republican appointees
now serving on the Circuit Courts, and the Johnson-Kennedy appointees
similarly account for most non-Nixon Democratic judges on the Courts of
Appeals, these articles provide an approximate biographical profile of
the three groups (i.e., Nixon appointees, non-Nixon Democrats and non-
Nixon Republicans) being compared in this study. According to Goldman's
data, the Nixon appointments differed from the Eisenhower and Johnson-
Kennedy appointments in some of the following ways: (1) Eighty percent
of the Eisenhower appointees were Protestant as compared to 73.5 percent
of the Nixon appointees and 62.2 percent of the Kennedy-Johnson appoin-
tees. Thus Protestants dominate the judicial selections of all three
groups. Goldman also found Protestantism to be significantly correlated
with pro-prosecution voting behavior on criminal procedures issues.
(2) Fifty percent of the Nixon appointees to th^- Courts of Appeals had
prior judicial experience as compared to 55.6 percent of the Eisenhower
appointees and 59.2 percent of the Johnson and Kennedy appointees. (3)
17.6 percent of the Nixon appointees had been candidates for or elected
to political office as compared to 19.9 percent of the Kennedy-Johnson
appointees and 20 percent of the Eisenhower appointees. However, Goldman
also found that Nixon appointees had more extensive political backgrounds
than had Eisenhower appointees when other types of political experience
were considered. He found that in this respect the Nixon appointees
were more like prior Democratic nominees, particularly those from the
Kennedy Administration. (4) 50.1 percent of Nixon appointees had prior
prosecutorial experience as compared to 47.1 percent of Johnson appoin-
tees (no information collected on Eisenhower and Kennedy appointees
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in this regard). Goldman comments that
(5) Goldman also found that the "majority of both Johnson and Nixon
appointees had attended private or ivy league law schools." The same
was true for Kennedy and Eisenhower appointees, 66.7 percent of each
group attending the more expensive private institutions, a possible
indication of social class origin. (6) Finally, 29.1 percent of
Nixon appointees as compared to 22.2 percent of Eisenhower appointees
and 19.9 percent of Kennedy-Johnson appointees were members of large
(five or more members) law firms prior-to their appointment to judicial
office. Such a background, according to Goldman, is also likely to-be
associated with higher socio-economic status.
Goldman's figures underline the essential similarity of the three
groups. He suggests that Republican appointees, whether of Nixon or
Eisenhower, "tended to come from a higher socio-economic stratum than
Democratic appointees." However, he also stresses that most judges of
both parties were solidly rooted in the "middle class" with most
mobility confined to movement within that class.
Thus there is little in the biographical data to suggest that
Nixon appointees, so similar to prior appointees of other administrations,
would revolutionize judicial policy on law and order. However, previous
students engaged in aggregate research have found only the slimmest links
between selected biographical characteristics of judges and their
^^ibid., pp. 941-2.
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behavior on the court. Moreover, despite the "surface" similarity of
the three groups, the "screening" process purportedly conducted by the
Nixon Administration could still have resulted in the selection of a
distinctively "conservative" group of judges on "law and order" issues.
The next chapter will compare the voting behavior of Nixon appointees
with non-Nixon Democrats and Republicans in an attempt to measure
the impact of the Nixon appointees on the disposition of criminal
appeals in fiscal 1973. The following chapter will focus exclusively
on non-unanimous cases decided during the period fiscal 1970 to 1973
in order to see if any observed differences in voting behavior can be
traced to attitudinal cleavages between and within the judge groups
being studied.
CHAPTER III
THE IMPACT OF THE NIXON APPOINTEES TO THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF
THE DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
DURING FISCAL 1973
Analysis of the previous two chapters suggests that the Nixon
Administration possessed both the will and the opportunity to appoint
a more "conservative" group of judges to the Courts of Appeals. Moreover,
by fiscal 1973, the Administration had already appointed thirty-seven of
what was eventually to be forty- three appeals court judges. This
chapter will attempt to determine what difference, if any, those appoint-
ments made in the disposition of criminal appeals during the fiscal 1973 term
of those courts.
As indicated in Table I, the eleven circuits of the United States
Courts of Appeals decided 1572 cases involving "blue collar" crimes during
the fiscal 1973 term. Eleven hundred forty-six of these cases were decided
against the criminal defendant or prisoner and only 366 were decided in his
favor. In sixty-one cases, the Courts of Appeals granted but also rejected
substantial aspects of defendant and prisoner claims as also can be seen in
Table I. If the numerical values previously discussed are assigned to
these voting choices, one arrives at a composite score of .50 out of a
possible range of 0 to 2.00 for the circuits taken as a whole. Of these
1572 cases. 111 or approximately seven percent were decided non-unanimously.
Of the 111 non-unanimous decisions, 59 were decided against and 52 for the
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defendant, producing a score of .94. Of the 1462 unanimously decided
cases, 1086 were decided against and 314 for the criminal defendant with
61 decisions in between resulting in a score of. 47. Table I suggests
that the chances of a decision being favorable to the criminal defendant
were greatest when the court was non-unanimous; however, even the pro-
defendant decisions were for the most part unanimously decided.
Viewed in another way the United States Courts of Appeals in fiscal
1973, if one excludes the sixty-one cases in which the panels took inter-
mediate positions, ruled for the accused person or prisoner twenty-four
percent of the time or about one case in four.^ The more even division
of the non-unanimous cases, whereby the panels decided 47 percent of the
cases in favor of the accused person or prisoner, suggests that many of
these cases may allow more opportunity for judicial discretion.
Although this may seem like a high rate of failure on the part of
state and federal prosecutors and might suggest a significant impact on
societal safety, it should be remembered that the federal government and
many state governments negotiate guilty pleas in over ninety percent of
cases scheduled for trial, and that these pleas are rarely appealed.
Moreover, successful appeals of guilty pleas are even rarer, partly due
perhaps to the Supreme Court's reluctance to review pleas based on
advice of counsel. Of the ten percent of federal cases which do go to
trail and result in a conviction, only one in five are appealed despite
the guaranteed right to do so and liberalized policies to aid the poor
in carrying out such actions. Finally, of those appellate decisions
which favored the accused a very small proportion directed a verdict of
acquittal or mandated a dismissal of the indictment. Usually the accused
received no more than the right to a new trial or hearing, the outcome
of which was not known to this researcher.
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TABLE I
DISPOSITION OF UNANIMOUS AND NON-UNANIMOUS
RIGHTS OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS' CASES
BY ALL CIRCUITS DURING FISCAL 1973
Unan. Non- Unan.
Total
Cases % Unan.
# % # % %
Pro-Def
.
314 (24) 52 (47) 366 (23) 86
Inter. 61 (4) 61 (4) 100
Anti-Def
.
1086 (74) 59 (53) 1145 (73) 95
Total Cases 1461 (100) 111 (100) 1572 (100) 93
Score .47 .94
.50
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Analysis of Individual Circuits
The hypothesis that Nixon appointees would vote as if they were
more "conservative" than either non-Nixon Republicans or non-Nixon
Democrats, 2 was supported by the composite scores in six of the eleven
circuits when they were examined separately, as shown in Table 2. In
five other circuits (the second, fourth, sixth, eighth, and tenth),
Nixon appointees had higher composite scores than one of the other two
judge groups. However, in no circuit did the Nixon appointees have the
highest composite score of the groups. In contrast, non-Nixon Republi-
cans scored highest in five of the eleven circuits (the first, third,
fourth, fifth, and tenth), and non-Nixon Democrats had the highest
composite score in six cir:,uits (the second, sixth, seventh, eighth,
ninth, and District of Columbia).
Six circuits (the second, third, fourth, fifth, ninth, and District
of Columbia) were of particular interest for reasons explained earlier
and are now examined in more detail. Tables 3-7 present the scores for
each judge group on eight categories of cases previously described.
These scores were computed on a minimum of ten votes for each judge group,
Scores were not computed for a group on a particular category of cases
if they cast less than ten votes in those types of cases.
2Th roughout the rest of this paper, non-Nixon Democrats and non-
Nixon Republicans will be referred to simply as Democrats and
Republ icans
.
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TABLE 2
COMPOSITE SCORES FOR JUDGE GROUPS BY CIRCUIT
Circuit
Cnmnn<; i tp
Score
Demorrfl
Compos i te
Score
KepuD 1 1 cans
Compos i te
Score
Nixon Appointees
1 .26
.44
.24
2
.59
.44
.50
3
.51
.61
.42
4 .52
.67
.56
5 .56
.68
.41
6 .73
.52
.66
7 .74 .64
.60
8 .48 .20
.46
9 .70 .36 .28
10 .45 .57 .54
D.C. .87
.48
Aggregate
Compos i te
Scores .60 .51 .43
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Ih^.DMricjL^^^ The District of Columbia Circuit
is particularly important to this study because the appointing administra-
tion has maximum freedom from party and regional pressures and also
because its location in the nation's capital warrants special attention
from the appointing administration. Therefore, the District of Columbia
Circuit is likely to reflect accurately the character of the appointing
administration. As only one non-Nixon Republican was involved in the
voting (and he cast only four votes), this analysis was confined to a
discussion of the Nixon appointees and non-Nixon Democrats on the circuit.
Moreover, the circuit hears only federal cases and there was no oppor-
tunity to compare the judges on their disposition of state cases. Thus
Table 3 presents the scores for only seven of the eight categories.
In fiscal 1973, the District of Columbia was the second most
liberal circuit and had the highest rate of conflict of all the circuits
(twenty percent of its cases were decided by non-unanimous votes). The
District of Columbia Circuit was also notable because of the significant
gap between the composite scores of Nixon appointees (.48) and Democrats
(.87). The differential of .39 was exceeded only in the ninth circuit
(discussed later). Considering only non-unanimous cases, as indicated
by Table 3, the difference between the two groups grew to 1.00 as Demo-
crats scored 1.33 as compared to .33 scored by Nixon appointees. More-
over, Nixon appointees failed to cast even one of fifteen votes for
criminal defendants in cases involving search and seizure and confession
issues, whereas Democrats scores .62 when one combines the votes for the
two categories. On cases not involving the search and confession issues,
the difference between the two groups shrunk to .35. It would appear.
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therefore, that administration freedom from considerations of Senatorial
courtesy has, as with the Supreme Court, resulted in a sharp split
between Nixon appointees to the District of Columbia Circuit and appoin-
,
tees from previous Democratic administrations.
The fifth circuit. The fifth circuit is important to this study
for several reasons. First, its size has had an impact on the aggregate
totals. The fifth circuit in fiscal 1973 decided 459 cases, almost one
third of all blue collar criminal cases decided by the United States
Circuit Courts of Appeals that fiscal year. Second, the geographic
location of the fifth circuit in the deep South and its long (recently
ended) history of one-partyism with the consequent regional domination
by conservative Congressional Democrats has made it more difficult for
the typical more liberal Democratic appointments to be made to the fifth
circuit. Kenneth Vines' study of the fifth circuit found that Democratic
appointees to the Federal District Courts of the fifth circuit were more
"conservative" than Republican appointees to those courts in race
relations cases. ^ He explained that the closer ties of Democrats to the
conservative southern social structure resulted in their greater
"conservatism" relative to Republican appointees. Although Vines did not
mention it as a source of Republican "liberalism" on race issues in this
region, Republican Presidents historically could avoid the obstacle of
Senatorial courtesy in appointments to the southern circuits. Thus the
fifth circuit like the District of Columbia circuit normally maximizes
the freedom of Republican Presidents in the appointment process and
3
Kenneth Vines, "Federal District Judges and Race Relations Cases
in the South," Journal of Politics , XXVI, No. 3 (1964), p. 350.
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serves as another excellent test of Presidential intentions."^
The results of the voting in the fifth circuit were dramatic.
Republicans scored
.68, their highest score in any circuit. Democrats
.scored
.56. Nixon appointees, however, scored only .41. Thus southern
non-Nixon Republicans, as in Vines' study of race relations cases, were
more liberal on criminal procedures cases than Democrats and notably
more liberal (differential of .27) than Nixon appointees. This pattern
is magnified in the non-unanimous cases where Republicans scored 1.29 on
seventeen votes as compared to .88 for Democrats and .52 for Nixon
appointees. The only exception to this, pattern occurred in the confes-
sion cases where Republicans scored only .07 (casting 14 of 15 votes
against the crimi-nal defendant and taking an intermediate position in
the other) in confession cases as compared to .19 for Nixon appointees
and .32 for Democrats. The lower score of the three Republican judges
on confession cases is perhaps attributable to the fact that the most
conservative of the three (Judge Brown) cast nine of the fifteen votes,
whereas the most liberal (Judge Tuttle) cast only one vote.^ All three
groups were considerably more lenient toward accused persons and prison-
ers in state than in federal cases, a pattern repeated in almost every
circuit. Republicans, Democrats and Nixon appointees scored .97, .83,
and .63 respectively in state cases, as compared to .51, .42, and .31
in federal cases, as shown in Table 4.
^Conservative Republicans such as Tower of Texas and Gurney of
Florida would pose no obstacle to Nixon Administration policies on
criminal procedures.
^On the basis of voting in non-unanimous cases over the four-year
period 1970-73, Judge Tuttle scored 1.80, Judge Wisdom 1.30, and
Judge Brown .92.
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TABLE 3
COMPOSITE SCORE BY ISSUE CATEGORY:
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Judge
Group
#
Judges
Confess
.
Cases
Search
& Seize
Cases
other
Crim.
Cases
Unan.
Cases
Non-
Unan.
Cases
All
Crim.
Cases
Dem. 8 1 .00 .43 .94 .68 1.33 .87
Rep. 1
Nixon
App. 3 .00 .00 .59 .53 .33 .48
TABLE 4
COMPOSITE SCORES BY ISSUE CATEGORY:
FIFTH CIRCUIT
Judge
Group Number of Judges
Fed.
Score Score State Cases Score
Confessions
Score
Search
Score
Other
Crim.
Cases
Score
Unan.
Score
Non-unan.
All
Crim.
Cases
Dem. 10 .42 .83 .32 .44 .60 .52 .88 .56
Rep. 4 .51 .97 .07 .21 .76 .63 1.29 .68
Nix 4 .31 .63 .19 .29 .45 .37 .52 .41
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The fourth,arcuit. The patterns in the fifth circuit were largely
repeated in the other southern circuit, the fourth. Republicans with a
composite score of (.67) were again the most liberal group although
Democrats (.52) replaced Nixon appointees (.56) as the most conservative
group. There were too few cases for comparison of the judge groups on
search and seizure and confession cases and non-unanimous cases. As for
the federalism issue, Nixon appointees were the only group more conserva-
tive on state than on federal cases scoring .42 on the first and .65 on
the latter. Democrats, on the other hand, scored .61 on state cases and
.49 on federal cases. Republicans scored 1.00 on state cases as compared
to only .53 on federal cases.
The ninth circuit. The ninth, or far western circuit, like the
fifth, is important because of the large number of criminal procedures
cases it decided, 319 in fiscal 1973 or approximately twenty percent of
all criminal cases decided in the Courts of Appeals during that fiscal
year. Together, the fifth and ninth circuits cecided over half of all
cases heard by the United States Courts of Appeals in fiscal 1973. The
ninth circuit is also important to this study because of Goldman's earlier
finding that "criminal procedures cases were important sources of con-
flict for the ninth circuit."^
As in the fifth circuit, the results were dramatic. As indicated
by Table 5, Democrats scored .70, Republicans .36, and Nixon appointees
.28. The gap of .42 between the most liberal and most conservative
groups was the largest of any circuit. When only non-unanimous cases
^Sheldon Goldman, "Conflict on the United States Courts of Appeals
1965-71: A Quantitative Analysis," Cincinatti Law Review
,
XXXXII, no. 4
(1973), p. 641.
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are considered the difference between Democrats 1.64 and Nixon appointees
(.14) is magnified to 1.50, again the greatest gap between any two groups
of judges on any circuit in the courts of appeals. The confession issue
Avas particularly divisive. Democrats scored 1.23 as compared to .00 for
both Republicans and Nixon appointees. The federalism issue did not,
however, divide the groups as dramatically as all three were much more
liberal on state than on federal cases, a common pattern for all the
circuits, as can be seen in Table 5.
The second and third circuits
. In contrast to the circuits which
maximized Nixon administration freedom from considerations of Senatorial
courtesy, the second and third circuits were both scenes of conflict
over- administration preferences and Senatorial prererogatives as the
Nixon administration quarreled with liberal Republican Senators
Jacob JaVits and Clifford Case. Considering first the overall totals,
Nixon appointees to the third circuit scored lower (.42 composite score)
than Republican appointees of earlier administrations who scored .61 and
also scored lower than Democrats who scored .51. Considering the fact
that the Nixon administration made five appointments to the third circuit,
these results seem to portend a swing to the right in that circuit on at
least the criminal cases.
In the second circuit Nixon appointees scored slightly higher
(composite score. 50) than other Republican appointees (.44) and lower
than the Democrats who scored .59. Thus when one views the cases as a
whole. Senatorial courtesy does not appear to have been a serious obstacle
to the Nixon administration's appointment of "conservative" judges in
the third circuit although his appointments were slightly more "liberal"
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in the second circuit as can be seen from Table 6.
On the non-unanimous cases, however, if one combines the votes of
the judge groups in the two circuits, as seen in the last column of
, Table 7, Nixon appointees emerge as the most "liberal" group, scoring
1.31 on 29 votes as compared to 1.20 for Democrats (30 votes) and only
.84 for Republicans (15 votes).
The situation is reversed, however, if one looks only at unanimously
decided cases. Then Nixon appointees are the most "conservative" group
in each circuit scoring only .36 in the third and .37 in the second.
Republicans are the most "liberal" group in the third circuit on the
basis of votes in unanimously decided cases (.53), and Democrats are the
most "liberal" group in the second circuit in such cases (.49)..
Thus Senatorial courtesy appears to be an important check on
administration preferences in the second and third circuits only if one
ignores the unanimously decided cases and regards only the non-unanimously
decided cases as valid indicators of judicial attitudes and voting
tendencies. '
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TABLE 5
COMPOSITE SCORES BY ISSUE CATEGORY-
NINTH CIRCUIT
Judge
Group
Number
of
Judges
Score
Fed.
Cases
Score State
Cases
Score
Confession
Search
&
Sei
zure
Other
Crim.
Cases
Unan.
Non-unan.
All
Crim.
Cases
Dem. 6 .64 .82 1 .23 .62
.66 .60 1 .64 .70
Rep. 7 .30 .48 .00 .47 .33 .31 1.14 .36
Nixon App. 6 .24 .55 .00 .25 .29 .28 .14 .28
TABLE 6
COMPOSITE SCORE BY ISSUE CATEGORY:
SECOND CIRCUIT
Judge
Group
#
Judges
Unan.
Cases
Non-unan.
Cases
All Crim.
Cases
Dem. 5*
.49 1.33
.59
Rep. 6 .41 .77
.44
Nixon App. 4 .37 1.82
.
.50
Democratic group includes one Liberal (Hayes)
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TABLE 7
COMPOSITE SCORE BY ISSUE CATEGORY-
THIRD CIRCUIT
Judge
Group
#
Judges
Unan.
Cases
N-Unan.
Cases
All
Crim,
Cases
N-Unan.
Cases 2d &
3d Circ.
Combined
Dem. 8 .45 1.00
.51 1.20
Rep. 2 .53 1.00
.61
.84
Nixon App. 5 .36 1.00
.42 1.31
Aggregate Analysis for Fiscal 1973
During fiscal 1973, thirty-seven Nixon appointees to the United
States Courts of Appeals cast 1380 votes in criminal procedures cases for
a composite score of .43. In contrast, seventy Democrats cast 2190 votes
for a composite score of .60. Finally, thirty-four Republicans cast 872
votes in fiscal 1973 for a composite score of .51. Thus there is evidence
to support the hypothesis that Nixon appointees in the aggregate would be
more conservative than non-Nixon Republicans and non-Nixon Democrats.
The federalism issue . A striking aspect of the overall findings is
that all three groups of judges scored higher on the claims of state
rather than federal defendants. The Democrats scored .76 on 537 votes
cast in state cases compared to .55 on 1613 cases appealed from the federal
level for a difference in scores of .21. Similarly, Republicans scored
.66 on 195 state cases and only .44 on 651 federal cases for a .22
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differential. Nixon appointees scored
.64 on 306 state cases as opposed
to
.36 on 1056 federal cases, for a differential of .28. Table 8
presents these results.
This was surprising. It was expected that at least Nixon appointees
and Republicans would score lower on state prosecutions. But the federal-
ism issue did not seem to divide the judges in this manner. It seems
likely that the more favorable treatment given by all three groups to
offenders at the state level reflects the large number of state cases in
which a state judge was overruled for dismissing a habeas corpus petition
without a hearing, although the difference may also reflect lower standards
of due process at that level. In either case the federalism issue or lack
of it was not a significant factor in explaining the voting differences
observed between the three groups of judges.
The confession and search and seizure issues . Similarly, all
three groups tended to take a harsher position toward criminal defendants
in confession and search and seizure cases than in other criminal cases.
As with the federalism issue, however, this difference may bo due to the
nature of some confession and search cases in which the appellate court
upheld a trial judge's finding that disputed evidence was admissible.
These hearings within a trial to determine admissibility of evidence are
more difficult for an accused to challenge because the state must only
prove a preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable
doubt as in the trial itself. Table 9 presents these comparisons.
However, the differences between the lowest scoring group (Nixon
appointees) and the highest scoring (Democrats) are slightly larger in
the search and confession cases than in the "all other criminal cases"
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category and the same is true when Democrats and Republicans are compared.
Thus, unlike the federalism issue, cases involving the confession and
search and seizure issues do appear to be somewhat more divisive for
'Nixon appointees and Republicans on the one hand and Democrats on the
other. Above all, however, the figures portray a marked reluctance on
the part of all three groups of judges to employ the exclusionary rule
to throw out convictions based on alleged coerced statements as compared
to their willingness to overturn convictions based on other alleged
violations of due process. It does not appear from the quantitative
evidence, then, that Miranda and its progeny have "thrown open prison
gates" if the voting behavior of United States Appellate Court judges
is indicative of judicial behavior in other "lower" courts. '
TABLE 8
COMPOSITE SCORES FOR AGGREGATE JUDGE GROUPS:
FEDERAL AMD STATE CASES, FISCAL 1973
Judge
Group
State
Dem.
Rep,
Nixon App.
Diff. in
scores bet.
Dem. & Nix.
app.
#
Votes
537
195
305
Scores
.76
66
,64
12
Federal
Votes
1613
651
1056
Scores
.55
.44
36
19
Diff. in
Scores
.21
.22
.28
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TABLE 9
^POSITE SCORES FOR AGGREGATE JUDGE GROUPS- COflFFSSinwSEARCH AND "ALL OTHER CASES" CATEGORIES FISCAL 1973
Judge
Group
Confession
Dem.
Rep.
Nix.
Diff. in
scores bet.
Dem. & Nix.
app.
Votes
108
47
69
Score
Search &
Seizure
.39
.19
.19
20
Votes
370
130
231
Score
All Other
Criminal Cases
.50
.34
28
22
Votes
1672
669
1061
Score
,62
.53
,47
.15
Unanimous versus non-unanimously decided cases
. There were also,
as expected, sharper differences between the three major groupings of
judges when the non-unanimous deicsions were treated separately from the
unanimous decisions. Democrats scored 1.14 as compared to .96 for
Republicans and .61 for Nixon appointees. In the unanimous cases. Demo-
crats scored .54 as contrasted to .47 for Republicans and .41 for Nixon
appointees. Thus the scores of all three groups rise when only the non-
unanimous cases are considered with both Democrats and Republicans moving
into the moderate category. The much greater difference between the
three groups on the non-unanimous as compared to the unanimous cases
suggests that the former cases may be the best indicators of the ideolo-
gical predispositions of the judges. On this particular measure, the
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Differences between the highest and lowest scoring groups on unanimous
cases was only
.13 but rose to .53 on non-unanimous cases as can be
seen in Table 10.
TABLE 10
COMPOSITE SCORES FOR AGGREGATE JUDGE GROUPS: UNANIMOUS
AND NON-UNANIMOUS CASES, FISCAL 1973*
Judge
Group
Non-
Unanimous
Votes Score
Unanimous
Votes Score
Difference Median Score
Dem. 225 1.14 1965 .54 .60
.64
Rep. 73 .96 799 .47 .49
.48
Nix. 128 .61 1252 .41 .20 .46
Diff. in
scores bet.
Dem. & Nix.
app. .53 .13 .18
*Includes all criminal cases
Categorizing individual judges . Another way of comparing the three
groups of judges is to compute the percentage of each group that falls
into the "liberal," "moderate," and "conservative" categories using
fifteen votes cast as a minimum number for purposes of classifying an
individual judge. Thirty-four of thirty-five Nixon appointees who
satisfied this criterion fell into the "conservative" category with the
remaining one a "moderate." The median score of the Nixon appointees
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was
.46. Of the Republicans 15 nf is ,„t., »u • •H m-c , 13 or 18 with the minimum number of votes
fell into the conservative category and three were classified as
moderates. The median score for Republicans was
.48. Finally, 32 of 46
Democrats were categorized as conservative with 13 falling into the
moderate group, and one, Skelly Wright of the District of Columbia Circuity
classified as a liberal. The median score for Democrats was
.64. as can
be seen in Table 1 1
.
TABLE n
PERCENTAGES OF JUDGE GROUPS IN "LIBERAL " "MODERATE "
AND "CONSERVATIVE" CATEGORIES
FISCAL 1973
Democrat
# %
Republ ican
U 01
It 10
Nixon Appointee
# %
Total (Lib., Mod. , Con.)
# %
Lib. 1 .02
.00
.00 = 1 (1%)
Mod. 13 .28 3 .14 1 .03 = 17 (17%)
Con. 32 .70 18 .86 34 .97 =84 (82%)
Total 46 100% 21 100%
\
35 1 00% 102 (100%)
Exclusion of the fourth and fifth circuits
. As it has been argued
that the peculiar historical circumstances surrounding party politics in
the southern circuits may have distorted the combined results, aggregate
scores were computed which excluded the two southern circuits.
When these circuits were excluded, the Nixon appointees retained
almost the identical score (.43) as when these circuits were included.
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Democrats, on the other hand, moved from .60 to .64 when the fourth and
fifth circuits were excluded and Republicans slipped from .51 to .43.
Thus the more "liberal" Republican judges in the southern circuits seem
,to account for the observed differences between the scores of Nixon
appointees and non-Nixon Republicans on criminal procedures issues in
fiscal 1973. See Table 12.
TABLE 12
IMPACT OF EXCLUDING THE FOURTH AND FIFTH CIRCUITS ON COMPOSITE
GROUP SCORES FOR FISCAL 1973: ALL CASES
Judge
Group
All Circuits
Incl uded
4th & 5th Circuits
Excluded Difference
Dem.
.60
.64 + .04
Rep.
.51
.43
-.08
Nix. .43
.43
.00
Diff. bet.
Dem. & Nix.
app. .17
.21
The exclusion of the fourth and fifth circuits has a similar impact
on non-unanimous case scores although the Nixon appointees remain the
most conservative of the three groups, as can be seen in Table 13. Nixon
appointees increased their score from .61 to .66. Republican scores
dipped from .96 to .79 and scores for Democrats rose from 1.14 to 1.26.
Thus the gap between Nixon appointees and Democrats increases to .60
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outside the southern circuits and the gap between Democrats and Republicans
grows to
.47 when the southern circuits are excluded.
TABLE 13
IMPACT OF EXCLUDING FOURTH AND FIFTH CIRCUITS ON COMPOSITE
JUDGE GROUP SCORES FOR FISCAL 1973- NON-
UNANIMOUS CASES
Judge
Group
All Circuits
Included
4th & 5th Circuits
Included Difference
Dem. 1.14 1.26 + .12
Rep.
.96
. .79
-.17
Nix.
.61
.66 + .05
Diff. bet.
Nix. ,& Dem.
appoi ntees .53
.60
Finally, as one can see from Table 14 (as compared to Table 11),
excluding the fourth and fifth circuits increases the percentage of Demo-
crats classified as "moderate," while reducing the percentage classified as
"conservative." In contrast, the effect on Republicans is to increase the
percentage categorized as "conservative" and decrease the percentage of
"moderates" until the Republicans as a group are almost identical to the
Nixon appointees who remain unchanged by the exclusion of the southern
circuits
.
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TABLE 14
'''''™SsFL'T?Sp..^^?f ' IN "LIBERAL," MODERATE," ANDCONSERVATIVE" CATEGORIES WHEN FOURTH AND
FIFTH CIRCUITS ARE EXCLUDED
Democrats
IT lo
Republ icdns
# %
Nixon Appointees
# %
Lib. 1
.03
.00
.00
Mod. n .34 1
.06 1
.03
Con. 20 .63 15
.94 29
.97
Total 32 loo;^ 16 100% 30 100%
Summary
The quantitative analysis of all criminal procedures cases decided
during fiscal 1973 supported the expectation that Nixon appointees would
cast a greater proportion of votes against the accused and prisoners than
either non-Nixon Democrats or non-Nixon Republicans when these groups were
taken in the aggregate. This was true for all categories of cases
considered when measured by the composite scores of the three groups.
When, however, the focus was on individual circuits, the Nixon appointees
were the lowest scoring group in only six of the eleven circuits. In
five other circuits (the second, fourth, sixth, eighth, and tenth), Nixon
appointees scored higher than or were equal to at least one of the other
groups. However, as shown in Table 3, in no circuit did Nixon appointees
score higher than both other groups, in contrast to Democrats who scored
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highest in six circuits and Republicans who scored highest in five.
Of particular interest were the high scores of non-Nixon Republi-
cans in the fourth and fifth circuits. It was observed that the
,
differences in the scores in all blue collar criminal procedures cases
between Republicans and Nixon appointees could be accounted for by the
differences in voting behavior in the fourth and fifth circuit. When
these circuits were excluded there were no differences in the scores
between the two Republican groups. When only non-unanimous cases were
examined there were differences in the three groups as expected, which
held up even when the southern circuits were excluded.
It was also observed that the federalism issue did not divide
the three groups of judges but that there was some evidence that the
search and seizure and confession issues were more divisive than other
types of criminal cases. A more important finding with regard to the
latter issue were the much lower scores of all three groups of judges on
confession issues as compared to search and seizure and the "all other
criminal cases" categories, perhaps reflecting the degree to which the
American judicial system has come to depend on self incrimination as a
means of coping with a constantly expanding caseload or the greater
weakness of defendants' cases. A particularly unexpected aspect of the
federalism issue was the more favorable treatment given to defendants
processed by the state than to those subject to the federal criminal
justice system, as it was thought that at least Nixon appointees and
Republicans might be less lenient than Democrats with regard to the
rights of state defendants, reflecting the greater concern of the
former two groups with "states rights."
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Finally, the aggregate figures, based on all blue collar criminal
cases, suggest an essential similarity and "conservatism" of the three
groups of judges. Translated into percentage terms. Democrats decided
'for the criminal defendant or prisoner roughly thirty percent of the
time as compared to twenty-five percent for Republicans and twenty-one
percent for Nixon appointees. The influx of Nixon appointees then did
not constitute radical change when one views the matter in such quan-
titative terms.
The similarity and "conservatism" of the three groups might be
explained in one of two ways: It could be argued that the dominant role
of the Justice Department in the recruitment of judges results in the
selection of prosecution orientated individuals no matter which adminis-
tration is in power. On the other hand, many unanimously decided cases
(and some non-unanimously decided cases also) may represent "frivolous"
defendant or prisoner appeals in 'the sense that even "liberal" judges
have little choice but to reject them. Therefore, the inclusion of
unanimously decided cases may distort the attitudinal characterization
of judges. Recall from Table 10 that the difference between the compo-
site scores of the lowest (Nixon) and highest (Democrats) scoring groups
was only .13 (.41 to .54) on unanimously decided cases but grew to .53
(.61 to 1.14) on the non-unanimously decided cases. Recall further that
all three groups of judges fell into the "conservative" classification on
unanimously decided cases but that both Democrats and Republicans rose
into the "moderate" category on non-unanimously decided cases, and that
Democrats as a group were in the "liberal" classification (1.26) on non-
unanimously decided cases when the southern circuits were excluded. It
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is possible then that the attitudinal characterization of judges Is .ost
useful for understanding conflict (which admittedly Is rare; approximately
one case in fourteen) on the courts of appeals and that attitudinal
characterizations based on unanimous case scores are misleading. It is
possible also that the identification of judicial attitudes on the
courts of appeals is useful for explaining only a limited aspect of
appeals court behavior.
In conclusion, the Nixon appointees had some, but not a radical,
impact on the aggregate disposition of criminal appeals during fiscal
1973, an impact which varied considerably from circuit to circuit. The
next chapter will attempt to account for some of the differences observed
by examining evidence of attitudinal cleavages in the voting behavior
of the three judge groups. Only non-unanimous cases will be used in
the following analysis because it can be assumed with some certainty
that those cases presented opportunities for the exercise of reasonable
judicial discretion.
CHAPTER IV
CONFLICT ON THE COURTS OF APPEALS: ATTITUDES. BACKGROUNDS
AND THE DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL APPEALS IN NON-
UNANIMOUS CRIMINAL CASES FOR FISCAL 1970-73
The composite score used in Chapter Three as the primary measure
of the "impact" of the Nixon appointees has two serious shortcomings as
an indicator of the attitudinal characteristics of the judges, the pri-
mary concern of this chapter: First, it sometimes combines both unani-
mous and non-unanimous cases. Second, it does not take into account
the fact that some judges cast more votes than others. Thus the compo-
site score may distort measurement of the central attitudinal tendencies
of each of the three judge groups. Therefore, this chapter will employ,
in addition to the composite score, a medians test, v/hich weighs all
judge scores equally no matter how many votes they cast. In addition,
the analysis in this chapter will be confined almost completely to non-
unanimous cases where the exercise of judicial discretion can be
assumed with some confidence.
During the period July 1, 1969 to June 30, 1973, the United States
Courts of Appeals decided 530 non-unanimous cases involving the rights
of accused persons and prisoners. Forty-five percent of these cases
were decided in favor of the accused, fifty-two percent were decided
against them with three percent falling in between. This is in contrast
to fiscal 1973 (which included those decided unanimously) when only
twenty-three percent of the decisions were in favor of the accused or
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prisoner, as can be seen in Table 15. Moreover, 49.7 percent of individual
votes favored the accused or prisoner in the non-unanimous cases. The
more equal division of votes and decisions in non-unanimous cases again
-suggests that non-unanimous cases may contain more factual and legal ambi-
guities, thereby providing more frequent opportunities than unanimous cases
for the exercise of a wide range of discretion, and they may therefore
reveal more about judicial attitudes toward the social and political issues
embodied in criminal cases.
TABLE 15
COMPARISON OF CASE DISPOSITION: FISCAL 1973 AND FISCAL 1970-73
N-Unan. Cases
Fi seal
1970-73
N-Unan. Cases
r 4 1
1 1 3ua
1
1973 Only
All Cases
Fiscal
1973
Pro-Defendant 45% 47% 23%
Intermed. -30/O/o 2%
Anti-Defendant 52% 53% 75%
Although, as was seen in the last chapter, aggregate analysis may
obscure important circuit differences, the major hypothesis of the study
that Nixon appointees would vote as if they were more "conservative" than
both non-Nixon Republicans and non-Nixon Democrats, is supported by the
aggregate data from non-unanimous cases for fiscal 1970-73. This time,
however, the margins of difference between the three groups are greater,
as indicated by Table 16, column 2. Democrats score 1.18; and when voting
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in the fourth and fifth circuits is excluded, Democrats score 1.26 on non-
unaniraously decided cases from fiscal 1970-73, as can be seen in the last
column of Table 16.
In contrast, Republicans score .34 on the non-unanimous cases and
Nixon appointees score
.58. When the southern circuits are excluded, the
composite score for Republicans falls to .73 on the non-unanimous cases
and the score of Nixon appointees increases to .60. So the exclusion of
the southern circuits again has the effect of narrowing the difference
between the Nixon appointees and non-Nixon Republicans, although this time
the latter group remains more "conservative," as can be seen in Table 16.
TABLE 16
COMPARISON OF COMPOSITE NON-UNANIMOUS CASE SCORE
FOR FISCAL 1970-73 WITH UNANIMOUS CASE SCORES
FOR FISCAL '75 BY JUDGE GROUP
Judge
Group
Score 1973
Unan. Cases
Score 1970-73
Non-Unan.
Differ-
ential
Score Non-unan.
4th & 5th Circ.
Excl uded
Democrats .54 1.18 + .64 1.26
Republ icans .47 .84 + .37 .73
Nixon .41 .58 + .17 .60
Diff. between
Nixon App. &
Dem.
.13 .60 .47 .66
As in the last chapter, "Democrats" refers to non-Nixon
Democrats and "Republicans" refers to non-Nixon Republicans.
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Classification of Individual Judges Based on
Non-unanimous Case Votes
Classifying judges on the basis of scores in at least six
unanimous cases results in a wider "spread" of the judges among the
"liberal," moderate," and "conservative" divisions than the earlier
classification, which was based primarily on votes in unanimously
decided cases. Whereas only one judge in the entire population of
judges was classified as a "liberal" when the latter cases were used,
thirty-five judges or thirty-four percent of the judge population are
classified as "liberal" when only non-unanimous cases were considered.
The number of "moderates" remains about the same (17), but the number of
"conservatives" is reduced from 84 to 43 when votes in non-unanimous cases
are used, as can be seen in Table 17. Thus the criminal defendant has a
much better chance of encountering sympathetic judges in non-unanimous
cases, but still has a less than even chance of a favorable decision, as
the center of gravity remains in the "conservative" category.
Democrats, as expected, dominate the "liberal" grouping, twenty-
five of the thirty-five judges classified as "liberal" being non-Nixon
Democrats. In fact, forty-four percent of non-Nixon Democrats fall into
the "liberal" category as compared to twenty-nine percent of the Republi-
cans and eighteen percent of Nixon appointees. Nixon appointees also
place a smaller percentage of judges in the "moderate" category than do
either of the other two groups, and place a much larger percentage of
judges in the "conservative" category than do Democrats and Republicans,
as can be seen from Table 18.
When the southern circuits are excluded, the net effect, as in
the last chapter (Table 14), is to narrow the difference between
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Republicans .nd Nixon appointees and increase the distance between these
two groups and the more "liberal non-southern Democrats, as can be seen
from Table 19.
TABLE 17
ATTITUDINAL CLASSIFICATION OF JUDGES: COMPARISON OF
CLASSIFICATIONS BASED ON UNANIMOUS CASES
WITH CLASSIFICATIONS BASED ON
NON-UNANIMOUS CASES ONLY
All C
Fiscal
#
ases
1973
%
Only N-Une
197(
#
in. Cases
)-73
%
Diffe
#
rence
%
Lib. 1 .01 35
.34 +34 + .33
Mod. 17 .17 22
.24 + 5 + .07
Con. 84 .84 43 .42 -41
-.42
Total 102 100% 100 100%
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TABLE 18
PERCENTAGES OF JUDGE GROUPS IN "LIBERAL," "MODERATE " AMD
"CO.NSERVATIVE" CATEGORIES: NON-UNANIMOUS
CASES, FISCAL 1970-73
Democrat Republ lean
Nixon
Appointee
Total "Lib,"
"Con," "Mod
% TT % # %
Lib. 25 .44 6 .29 4 .18 35 (34%)
Mod. 11 .19 7 .33 4 .18 22 (24%)
Con. 21 .37 8 .28 14 .64 43 (42%)
Total 57 100.^ 23 100% 22 100%
TABLE 19
PERCENTAGES OF JUDGE GROUPS IN "LIBERAL," "MODERATE," AND
"CONSERVATIVE" CATEGORIES, SOUTHERN CIRCUITS
EXCLUDED: NON-UNANIMOUS CASES
FISCAL 1970-73
Democ rat
0/
lO
Republ
#
ican
%
Nixo
Appoin
#
n
tee
%
Tot
#
.al
%
Lib. 20 .49 3 .19 4 .21 27 36
Mod. 7 .17 5 .31 4 .21 16 21
Con. 14 .34 8 .50 n .58 33 43
Total 41 100% 16 100% 19 100% 76 100%
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Analysis of Individual Circuits
As in the preceding chapter, the voting behavior of Nixon appoin-
tees varies considerably from circuit to circuit, and in only four of
,the ten circuits analyzed (there were insufficient votes to include the
first circuit), the fourth, fifth, ninth and District of Columbia, are
Nixon appointees the most "conservative" of the three judge groups.
In three other circuits, the seventh, eighth, and tenth, Nixon appoin-
tees are more liberal than one other judge group and in three circuits,
the second, third, and sixth, Nixon appointees are more "liberal" than
both other groups of judges, as can be seen in Table 20.
The four circuits in which Nixon appointees were the most
"conservative" are the same circuits discussed in detail in the analysis
of all cases for fiscal 1973. These circuits, the fourth, fifth, ninth
and District of Columbia, were the ones in which there was maximum Admini-
stration freedom from Senatorial constraints, thus permitting the
appointment of appeals judges closest in ideology to the Nixon Administra-
tion. The results suggest that it is this factor which accounts for the
"conservative" voting behavior of Nixon appointees when compared to other
judge groups in those circuits.
Similarly, two of the three circuits in which Nixon appointees
were the most liberal group, the second and third, are the two circuits
in which the Nixon Administration faced maximum publicized resistance.
This was particularly true of the second circuit where Nixon appointees
were clearly more "liberal" in their voting on non-unanimous cases than
were the other two groups.
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TABLE 20
COMPOSITE JUDGE GROUP SCORES BY CIRCUITS: NON-UNANIMOUSLY
DECIDED CASES, FISCAL 1970-73*
Circuit Democrats+ Republ
i
cans Nixon Appointees
#
Votes
Cast
Score
#
Votes
Cast
Score
u.
n
Cast
Score
c 75 1.29 79
.68 Co
1 .48
o
o 93 1.08 19 1.05 fin 1.10
/I4 76 .95 27 1.33 Q
.44
c
D 199 .90 44 1.23 33
.42
6 72 .88 12
.42 13
.92
7 78 1.26 19
• T t- CO
8 71 1.18 30
.27 11
.55
9 167 1 .53 111 1.00 81
.33
10 25 .68 16
.31 11 .55
D.C. 315 1.31 4 .00 103 .27
Total 1171 1.18 361 .84 376 .58
First circuit excluded because of insufficient votes in non-
unanimous cases.
"""Seventy-one Democrats cast votes in non-unanimous cases as
compared to thirty- three Republicans and thirty-six Nixon appointees.
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as a
In order further to test the potency of Senatorial Courtesy
check on the Presidential appointment power and better to account for
the observed circuit and individual differences in the voting behavior
of Nixon apoointees, A.D.A. scores were obtained for Republican Senators
eligible to veto Nixon appointments to the courts. "I Nixon appointees
were then grouped into "liberal," "moderate," and "conservative"
categories on the basis of their votes on non-unanimously decided cases
and average A.D.A. scores computed for the Senators corresponding to each
of the three judge grouping. Table 21 ranks and groups the Nixon appoin-
tees by score based on votes in at least six non-unanimous cases and gives
the corresponding A.D.A. score for the Senator potentially able to veto
his appointment. In cases where there was no Republican Senator to
oppose the judicial nominee an A.D.A. score of .00 was assigned to indicate
the lack of Senatorial opposition to the nominee.
Although only twenty-two Nixon appointees cast enough votes (6)
to be included in the analysis, there were significant differences between
the A.D.A. scores of Senators linked with the eight Nixon appointees who
scored in the "moderate" or "liberal" range and Senators associated with
the thirteen Nixon appointees in the "conservative" grouping, as Table 19
shows. Applying Spearman's Rank-Difference Correlation to the date in
Table 21 produced a correlation coefficient of .42.^
When two Senators were in a position to veto a nomination, an
average A.D.A. score was computed for them. Each individual Senator's
A.D.A. score was computed on the basis of his performance in Congress over
the four-year period fiscal 1969-73.
2
Method described in Dorothy Adkins, Statistics (Columbus: Merrill,
1964), p. 282, and in Sidney Siegel, Nonparametric Statistics for the
Behavioral Sciences (New York: McGraw Hill
, 1956), p. 202.
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TABLE 21
COMPARISON OF SENATE A.D.A. SCORES AND
JUDICIAL VOTING TENDENCIES*
Judge
Name
1
KepuD Mean
C 1 re
.
Sta ; ^- ^ P M Q Kank
Senator
'
s
Name(s) A.D.A. Rank
2 Oakes Vt. 2 00 11 Ml Ken a .44+ 10
2 Mansfield N.Y. 1 .33 2 5
r routy
vJdVl LS &
Mulligan N.Y. 1 .33
D u L K. 1 ey
. 4b 8.52 2 5 II
.45
.88
8.5
1.5
3 • Gibbons N.J. 1.30 4 Case
3 Rosenn Penn. 1.17 5 Srntt
Adams
^rWvA/oi 1/ QJi-ilWt: 1 Is. CI "37.0/ 1 1
3 Penn. 1 .04 6 II "57 3
3 Hunter N.J. 1 .00 7 V/ Q O C
. oo 1 . D
5.5
7 Stevens Ill
.
.91 8 Pp 1«p \/rer cy
. OC
9 Wright Wash
.
.73 9 nn IP t;
1 o . D
5 In'^raharr Texas .57 10 Tower nn 1 P R
7 Pell Ind." .53 1
1
nn IP c
1 O. 0
5 Roney Fla. .36 12 Gurney
.07 13
7 Sprecher 111. .33 14.5
• uc
8 Ross Neb. .33 14.5 Hruska &
Curtis .03 14
9 Choy Haw. .33 14.5 Fong
.24 12
D.C. Wil key .33 14.5
.00 18.5
D.C. Robb .32 17
.00 18.5
5 Clark Miss. .29 18.5
.00 18.5
6 Brooks Kent. .29 18.5 Cook &
D.C.
Cooper .50 7
MacKinnon .20 20
.00 18.5
9 Kilkenny Ore. .19 21 Packwood &
Hatfield .64 5
9 Trask Neb. .18 22 Goldwater &
Fannin .02 15
Spearman Rank Order Correlation = .42
*Only Nixon appointees who cast at least six votes in non-unanimous
cases were included in this table.
+When there were two Senators from an appointee's state their A.D.A.
scores were averaged together.
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Even when the
.00 A.D.A. scores signifying the absence of Republican
Senators from the states of six judicial appointees are excluded, the
differences between the mean A.D.A. score of Republican Senators from
states that produced conservative judges and the mean A.D.A. score of
Republican Senators from states that produced
"liberal-moderate" judges
remains
.36, as can be seen in Table 22.
TABLE 22
COMPARISON OF SENATE A.D.A. SCORES AND JUDICIAL VOTING
TENDENCIES: "LIBERAL" AND "MODERATE" CATEGORIES
COMBINED AND SIX JUDGES FROM STATES WITHOUT
REPUBLICAN SENATORS EXCLUDED
"Lib-Mod" Judge
Group
"Conservative"
Judge Group Difference
Mean Senate
A.D.A. Score .59
.15
.47
Mean Senate
A.D.A. Score
.59
(6 judges
.27 excluded) .36
Finally, all six of the Nixon appointees not encumbered by consi-
derations of senatorial courtesy fall into the "conservative" grouping,
whereas three of the four "liberal" Nixon appointees come from states
that have the most liberal Senators.
Bloc analysis of individual circuits . Bloc analysis is 9 method
used to study collegial courts both in the United States and in other
countries. The purpose of bloc analysis is to uncover voting alignments
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based on shared attitudes and values of the judges. ^ According to Goldman.
A judicial voting bloc can be said to exist when, in non-
unammous cases, two or more judges vote with each other
more frequently than with all other judges on their court
in at least a majority of the cases in which they jointly
participate.^ ^
Here bloc analysis was used to determine whether Nixon appointees
tended to have their highest rates of agreement with each other or with
other Democrats and Republicans. It was assumed that if they did form
cohesive blocs with each other and with similar ideological types, the
disposition of cases on the Courts of Appeals might be radically altered,
whereas if they did not, the influence of the Nixon appointments would
be minimized.
3
There is no evidence of "log rolling" on federal appellate courts
according to Sydney Ulmer. See "Toward a Theory of Sub-Group Formation
in the United States Supreme Court," Journa l of Politics, XXVII, No. 1
(1965), p. 133.
-
4
Sheldon Goldman, "Conflict on the United States Courts of Appeals
1965-1971," Cincinatti Law Review
, XXXXII, no. 4 (1973), p. 645. Goldman
describes the McQuitty method of bloc construction as one designed to
identify psychological types. In this method, "one first examines the
matrix of rates of agreement and underlines the highest percentage
agreement in each column of the matrix. The highest percentage agreement
is selected first, and the individuals with the highest percentage
agreement constitute the core of the first bloc. The next step is to
read across the rows of these individuals and bring in all of the people
whose entries were underlined indicating that they have their highest
agreement with one or more members of the core bloc. Then the rows of
these new members must be examined to determine if they bring in more
members. When no more members are brought in, one returns to the highest
remaining percentage agreement, which forms the core of the second bloc.
A similar process of reading across the rows is followed until that bloc
is exhausted. The matrix is analyzed until all individuals are classified
by bloc." However, this analysis imposed three qualifications upon the
identification of blocs: first, each judge had to serve on a minimum of
four cases with all other judges included in the blocs and, second, a
judge whose highest agreement was less than fifty percent was dropped
from the analysis, p. 645-6.
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Unfortunately, there were sufficient non-unani.ous cases to include
Nixon appointees in the bloc analysis of only five of the circuits, as
can be seen in Figure I. However, the results in these five circuits
.were revealing. In the third circuit three of four Nixon appointees,
Rosenn, Adams, and Hunter, joined Democrat Aldisert and Republican
Van Dusen in a "moderate" (determined by mean of individual judge scores
in bloc) bloc. Another Nixon appointee. Gibbons, ^ however, agreed most
readily with Democrat Seitz, and they formed a "liberal" bloc. Moreover,
Gibbons agreed with fellow Nixon appointees Hunter, Adams, and Rosenn
only forty, fifty-seven and sixty percent of the time respectively, as
compared to his one hundred percent agreement with Seitz. Nixon appoin-
tees then, did not constitute a monolithic or particularly "conservative"
bloc in the third circuit and no radical swing to the right is suggested
there. Moreover, the third circuit did not appear to be seriously
divided. Individual scores ranged only from Aldisert's .89 to Gibbons'
1.30 and the difference between the mean scores of the blocs was .28.
Bloc analysis of ths fifth circuit revealed a similar two-bloc
pattern: one "conservative" and one "moderate." As in the third circuit,
three Nixon appointees divided between the two blocs. Two Nixon appoin-
tees joined two Republicans and five Democrats in the nine-man "conserva-
tive" bloc which had a mean score of .59. One Nixon appointee, Clark,
joined five Democrats in a six-man "moderate" bloc with a mean score of
1.04. As in the third circuit, the blocs were remarkably cohesive,
particularly in the "conservative" blocs where all agreements were
^Recall that Gibbons was sponsored by Senator Case, the most "liberal"
(A.D.A. score .88) Republican Senator eligible to veto Nixon appointees.
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FIGURE I
VOTING BLOCS ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN
NON-UNANIMOUS CRIMINAL CASES; FISCAL 1970-73
Third Circuit
1.00 (12)+
Seitz (D)*^- Gibbons (N) 1.00 (9)Rosenn (N) ' zz^- Adams (N)
1.00 (6)
Hunter (N)
l.Ooj (5)
Van Dusen (R)
.69 (13)
Aldisert (D)
1.00 (5)
Bloc Type: "liberal"
mean score: 1
. 30
"moderate"
1 .02
Fifth Circuit
1.00 (8)
Thornberry (D) ±zz^ Morgan (D) Bel
1.00
1.00 (8)
(D) Brown (R)
/
\
i.oo:
(6)
Ingraham ,(N)
1.00||(6)
Coleman (D)
"conservative'
.59
1.0d\(5)
Ainsworth (D) Gewin (D)
.90
Roney (N)
l.Ool (5)
v\ '
i
\Dyer' '(D)
(10)
Wisdom (R)
Bloc Type: "Moderate"
Mean Score: 1 .04
*Indicates judge group (D stands for Democrat)
+Number of cases on which agreement score computed
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Ninth Circuit
.90 (10)
Hamley (R) Browning (D)
.80 (10 .80 (5)
Hufstedler (D) ^Wright (N)
A
.78 (17)
Ely
Bloc Type : "liberal"
mean score : 1.78 without Wright
1
.
56 with Wright
1.00 (7)
Kilkenny (N) tiz^Trask (N)
'
- >^ ']
'
1.00 !(4)>^ 1.00' (4)
Chambers (R) Carter (D)
.83 (6)
Barnes (R)
Bloc Type: "conservative"
mean score: .17
.88 (8)
Merrill (R) _ Duniway (D)
.80 (5) .80 (5)
Koelsch (R) \ Wright (N)
"moderate"
1 .33 without Wright
1.18 with Wright
District of Columbia Circuit
.91 (22)
Robinson (D) ^.-—^ Wright (D)
.90 ! (10)
i
Fahy (D)
A
.83 (56)
Bazelon (D)
Bloc Type: "liberal"
mean score: 1 .80
.92 (13)
Tamm (D)riz;Wilkey (N)
.76-1(25)
.78T(9)
MacKinnon (N) Robb (N)
Bloc Type: "conservative"
mean score: .31
.87 (23)
McGowan (D) ^=:r^Leventhal (D)
"moderate"
.89
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one hundred percent with the exception of the ninety percent agreement
between Wisdom and Gewin. Agreement in the "moderate" bloc ranged from
seventy to one hundred percent. Although Clark in the "moderate" bloc
agreed more with the Democrat Morgan, this should not obscure the fact
that he also agreed eighty percent of the time with fellow Hixon appoin-
tees, Roney and Ingraham. Moreover, flixon appointee Clark agreed with
fellow Nixon appointees Roney and Ingraham more than with any other
members of the "moderate" bloc where he was placed by the method for
computing the blocs. Thus the Nixon appointees do form a fairly cohesive
"bloc" in the fifth circuit although the formal analysis does not show it.
Although the seventh circuit did not produce enough non-unanimous
decisions for bloc analysis, there were sufficient cases to suggest that
the Nixon appointees Pell and Stevens were not likely to constitute a bloc
as they agreed in only one of four cases in which they participated. PelL
on the other hand, agreed one hundred percent of the time with "conserva-
tive" Democrat Cummings in five cases, and Stevens agreed twice in three
cases with "liberal" Democrat Swygert.
Again, in the ninth circuit, three Nixon appointees who decided
enough cases to be included in the bloc analysis were divided between two
of the three blocs that emerged there. A "liberal" bloc was composed of
three Democrats, one Republican, and one Nixon appointee, Wright, who
also could be classified with the "moderate" bloc. The "moderate" group
consisted of one Democrat, two Republicans and, again, Nixon appointee
Wright. A five-man "conservative" bloc contained the other two Nixon
appointees along with two Republicans and a Democrat. In contrast to the
third and fifth circuits, the blocs in the ninth circuit were sharply
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split ranging from the
.17 mean score of the "conservative" bloc to the
1.77 mean score of the "liberal" bloc with Wright excluded. The mean
score of the "moderate" bloc was 1.33 with Wright excluded. Although it
appears anomalous to include Nixon appointee Wright in the "moderate" or
"liberal" blocs when his score for non-unanimous votes (.73) is considered,
a closer examination of the matrix reveals that he agreed with fellow
Nixon appointees Kilkenny and Trask only three times in eleven decisions
in which they jointly participated. On the other hand, he agreed with
Merrill and Duniway of the "moderate" bloc eighty and seventy-eight per-
cent of the time respectively, and he also agreed with both Hamley and
Browning of the "liberal" bloc eightly percent of the time. Thus it
appears that Wright is correctly placed in either of those blocs and
separated from his fellow Nixon appointees in the "conservative" bloc.
Only in the District of Columbia Circuit, of the five circuits so
far analyzed, did the Nixon appointees, as on the Supreme Court, comprise
a cohesive and sharply "conservative" monolith. There, Nixon appointees
Wilkey, MacKinnon and Robb joined Democrat Tamm in a "conservative" bloc
with a mean score of .31. The "conservative" bloc was arrayed against
a "liberal" bloc (mean score of 1.80) consisting of Democrats Robinson,
Wright, Fahy and Bazelon. A third bloc (mean score .89) combined
Democrats McGowan and Leventhal
.
Thus although the results of the bloc analysis are tentative and
await further research, it appears that the Nixon Administration was
able to appoint a cohesive and monolithic group of judges to only the
District of Columbia Circuit (and to some degree the fifth circuit) where
appointment conditions similar to those on the Supreme Court prevail.
80
These findings must be counterpoised against the aggregate figures presented
in Table 23 which show a greater percentage of Nixon appointees falling
into "conservative" blocs than either Republicans or Democrats.
TABLE 23
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF EACH JUDGE GROUP IN "LIBERAL "
"MODERATE." AND "CONSERVATIVE" BLOCS
Bloc
Type
Demo
#
crat
%
Repub"
#
ican
%
Nixor
Appoi
r
#
1
itee
%
To
#
tal
%
Lib. 16 43% 5 29% 2 13% 23 33%
Mod. 9 24% 3 18% 5 33% 17 25%
Con. 12 33% 9 53% 8 54% 29 M%
Total 37 100% 17 100% 15 100% 69 100%
Socio-Political Background Characteristics
and Voting Behavior
The proposition that differences in judicial behavior can be in part
traced to the varying values and attitudes of judges is generally accepted
by scholars who study the courts. Scholars engaged in quantitative analysis,
however, have achieved only limited success in identifying socio-political
background characteristics associated with voting behavior. Generally
speaking, prior political party affiliation has been, as with studies of
American legislative bodies, the best single predictor of judicial voting
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behavior, particularly with regard to economic Issues.^ More germane to
this study, Goldnian's earlier studies of the courts of appeals found that
party, age and religion were the background variables which best corre-
lated with appellate voting behavior in criminal cases. 7 A„d Nagel, in
another early study of state supreme court justices, found prior prosecu-
torial experience to be significantly correlated with voting behavior in
O
criminal cases.
Most research in this area has assumed explicitly or implicitly that
"interests," as objectively defined by socio-economic class, are prime
determinants of political attitudes and values; and that these attitudes
and values are further refined, modified and transformed by professional
training and experience. Thus determinations of social class have been
based on undergraduate and postgraduate education, religion, father's
occupation, and family political status and influence.^ Studies of
political socialization have focused on regional origin and intensity of
social, economic and political ties to a particular region and party
Walter Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, The Study of Public Law
,
(New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 105-107.
^Sheldon Goldman, "Voting Behavior on the United States Courts
of Appeals Revisited," American Political Scie nce Review, LXIX, No. 2
(June 1975), p. 503.
g
Stuart Nagel, "Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases," Journal
of Criminal Law
,
LIII, No. 3 (1962), p. 336.
gSee John Schmidhauser, The Supreme Court: Its Politics ,.
Personalities, and Procedures (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston,
1960), Chapter 3. Also see Sheldon Goldman, "Johnson and Nixon
Appointees to the Lower Federal Courts: Some Socio-Pol i tical Perspec-
tives," Journal of Politics
,
XXXIV, No. 2 (1972).
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affiliation and activismJ^ Studies of professional socialization have
focused on occupation prior to assuming judicial office, types of legal
experience, years served on a particular court, and professional and
social ties among judges serving in the same circuit or on the same
collegial courtJ^ Age as related to attitudes has also been studiedj^
Here, judges were first coded on nine background characteristics:
party, religion, candidacy for or election to public office, prior
judicial or prosecutorial experience, appointing President, age, years on
the Courts of Appeals, and A.D.A. score of Senator or Senators of
President's party from the particular judge's state. These background
characteristics were treated as independent variables. The scores of
each judge who decided at least six non-unanimous cases over the period
fiscal 1970-73 and the scores of those who decided fifteen case"^ ^^^^^
unanimous and non-unanimous during fiscal 1973 were treated as the
dependent variables. For the dependent variables there were two different
but largely overlapping groups of judges, ninety-seven in the first group
(non-unanimous, fiscal 1970-73) and one hundred and four in the second
(fiscal 1973). The advantage of the second grouping was that it included
thirty-seven Nixon appointees, whereas the non-unanimous case group
^•^See Kenneth Dolbeare, "The Federal Courts and Urban Public Policy:
1960-57" in Grossman and Tanenhaus, Frontiers of Judi cial Research
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 19697! See also Kenneth Vines, "federal
District Court Judges and Race Relations Cases in the South," Journal of
Politics , Vol. 26 (1964), pp. 336-356. Also Goldman, Loc. cit .. "Johnson
and Nixon Appointees," p. 939.
^^See Robert Carp, "Scope and Function of Intra-Circui t Judicial
Communication," Law and Society Review
,
VI, No. 1 (Feb. 1972), p. 405.
^^Goldman, Op. cit ., "Voting Behavior Revisited," p. 31.
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m ne
included only sixteen Nixon appointees. These judge scores and the
background characteristics were run using the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciencesl^ and tests were also run to obtain the medians for each
of the three judge groups along with tests of statistical significance of
the differences in medians in addition, the stepwise multiple
regression procedure was used to measure the total contribution of all
the variables taken together in explaining the variance in voting
behavior and a partial correlation analysis was undertaken to measure
the unique contribution of each variable taken alone to the variation in
voting behavior.
Of the nine independent variables tested, only appointing president
(coded Nixon appointee or non-Nixon appointee) was related in a statisti-
cally significant way to voting on non-unanimous cases and only religion
(coded Protestant or non-Protestant) was related in a statistically
significant way to voting on all cases in fiscal 1973. Consequently,
religion and appointing President were selected for further analysis along
with age and prior prosecutorial experience which Goldman and Nagel
,
respectively, had found in earlier studies to be related to voting behavior
in criminal cases. The results of the statistical analysis of just the four
background characteristics are presented in Tables 25-27.
Stepwise multiple regression and partial correlation were two of the
1
3
Norman Nye, Dale Bent and Hadlai Hull, Statistical Package for
the Social Sciences (New York: McGraw Hill, 19707^
^^Mann Whitney U Test. Described in Sidney Siegel, loc. cit .,
pp. 116-127. "When at least ordinal measurement has been achieved, the
Mann-Whitney U Test may be used to test whether two independent groups
have been drawn from the same population." p. 116.
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are
tests utilized by Bowen and later by Ulmer^^ and GoldmanJ^ and
probably the most sophisticated statistical tests yet employed in back-
grounds analysis of judicial voting behavior. These tests make formid-
able assumptions of interval measurement and normal distribution of
dependent and independent variables that are technically difficult to
justify and must therefore be used with caution. However, they do permit
an approximation of the important research questions these methods seek
to answer, and taken in conjunction with tests based on the more
realistic assumptions of ordinal measurement, without assumptions of
normal distribution, can suggest a more complete portrait of the pheno-
mena under investigation.
The results of the stepwise multiple regression were consistent with
the findings of other studies that only a small percentage of the variance
in voting behavior can be explained by reference to background character-
istics. The total explained variance attributed to all the independent
variables taken together was 11.7 percent for all cases in fiscal 1973
and sixteen percent for non-unanimous cases from fiscal 1970-73.
The partial correlation indicated that religion was the most impor-
tant variable in explaining variations in voting behavior on non-unanimous
cases during fiscal 1970-73, followed by appointing President and age.
Nixon appointees, Protestants and older judges tended to be more "conser-
vative" than Catholics, Jews, younger judges and those appointed by
1
5
Sydney Ulmer, "Social Background and Supreme Court Voting,"
American Journal of Political Science
,
XVII, no. 3 (August, 1973),
pp. 622-629.
1 /-
Goldman, loc. cit. "Voting Behavior Revisited."
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TABLE 24
STEPWISE MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF
BACKGROUND VARIABLES AND SCORES
Issue
Variable in Order
of Entry in
Regression
Mul tiple
R
% of Explained
Variance
Criminal
Procedures
1970-73
Rel igion
President
Age
Prosecutor
.284
.335
.339
.40
8.0
n.2
15.9
16.0
Criminal
Procedures
Fiscal 1973
All Cases
President
Rel igion
Age
Prosecutor
.243
.325
.340
.342
5.9
10.5
11.5
11.7
Presidents other than Mixon. v-/\pv;i ICIIV.C «yuo mGT: rSiutGu
in a statistically significant way to the voting in non-unanimous cases.
When voting behavior for all cases in fiscal 1973 alone is considered,
appointing President is the most important variable, followed by
religion, with neither age nor prosecutorial experience being related to
the voting in a statistically significant way. However, as with the step-
wise multiple regression, the partial correlation shows the significantly
related background variables accounting for only a small proportion of
the variance in voting behavior, a finding consistent with those of
Goldman and Bowen. However, the association between religion and voting
in criminal cases demonstrated by Goldman is supported by the findings
here while the relationship between prosecutorial experience and voting
behavior discovered by Nagel is not. The association between voting
behavior and age is supported for one group of cases but not for the other,
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TABLE 25
CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF BACKGROUND VARIABLES
AND SCORES ON ISSUES
Issue
Background
Variabl e
i-tff u uraer
Correlation
With Issue
Partial (3d ord)
Correlation
With Issue
Reduction
Unexplained
Variance
Criminal
Procedures
Fiscal
1970-73
non-unan.
Age
Pres.
Pros
.
Rel.
-.142
-.189 n.s.*
-.035 n.s.
-.284
-.232
.035 n.s.
-.294
5.4
6.3
0.0
8.7
cases
Criminal
Procedures
Fiscal '73
All Cases
Age
Pres.
Pros.
Rel.
.002 n.s.
-.243
-.068 n.s.
-.223
-.0939 n.s.
-.256
-.045 n.s.
-.224
0.0
6.7
0.0
5.0
Not statistically significant (greater than 5 in 100 that result
could be obtained by chance).
Thus the findings concerning voting and background characteristics remain
mixed.
The medians tests are largely consistent with these findings.
Nixon appointees have statistically significant lower median scores than
Democrats and Republicans on non-unanimous cases and statistically signi-
ficant lower scores than Democrats on all cases decided during fiscal
1973. The difference between the medians of Nixon appointees and
Republicans for all cases in fiscal 1973 approaches but does not reach
statistical significance. Moreover, 57 percent of Democrats are above
The small difference in medians between Nixon appointees and
Republicans on 1973 cases approaches statistical significance at .06.
In one sense, however, statistical significance is meaningless as the
study has included the entire population of eligible judges and blue
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their own circuit median in non-unanimous cases and 58 percent in all
cases decided in fiscal 1973. In contrast, only 27 percent of Nixon
appointees were above their own circuit median score in fiscal 1973 cases
.and also in non-unanimously decided cases. Forty percent of Republicans
were above their own circuit median for all cases in fiscal 1973, and
52 percent of Republicans were above their own circuit medians for non-
unanimously decided cases, fiscal 1970-73, as can be seen In Table 27.
TABLE 26
MEDIAN SCORES OF JUDGE GROUPS ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURES ISSUES
Democrats
Med. #
Republ icans
Med
. if
Nixon
Appointee
Mori U
Signif
.
Nix.
u eiu
.
Level
Nix.
N-Unan.
Crim.
Cases
1970-73
.95 53 .88 22 .45 22 .01 .01
% of Judges
Above Own
Circ. Med.
58% 52% 27%
Cases
Fiscal
1973
.63 48 .48 23 .46 33 .00 .06 N.!
% of Judges
Above Own
Circ. Med.
57% 40% 27%
N.S. stands for not significant.
collar criminal cases for the time period studied. Tests of statistical
significance can be treated usefully if the cases are considered to be
only a sample drawn from all the criminal cases that these judges have
decided or will decide during their careers.
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TABLE 27
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND MEDIAN SCORES OF
JUDGES ON CRIMINAL ISSUES
Protestant
Med . #
Non-
Protestant
Med. #
Difference Significance
Non-unan.
Crim.
Cases
,
1970-73
.67 (63) 1.14 (34) .47
.01
All
Cases
1973
.48 (70) .64 (34) .16
.02
Similarly, there are large statistically significant differences
between the median scores for Protestants and non-Protestants on both non-
unanimous cases and for all cases decided during fiscal 1973. Finally,
the differences between the median scores of the judges without prior
prosecutorial experience and those with prior prosecutorial experience is
almost non-existent for cases decided in fiscal 1973 and only .11 on non-
unanimous cases with the non-prosecutors scoring higher, as can be seen in
Table 29. In neither case, however, were the differences in median scores
between prosecutors and non-prosecutors statistically significant. On
the contrary, there was a better than even chance that the difference was
attained by accident.
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TABLE 28
PROSECUTORIAL EXPERIENCE AND MEDIAN SCORES OF
JUDGES ON CRIMINAL CASES
Prosecutor
Med. #
Non-
Prosecutor
Med. #
Difference Significance
Non-unan.
Crim.
Cases
1970-73
.80 (43) .91 (54)
.11
.52 N.S.*
All
Crim.
Cases
1973
.52 (47) .53 (57) .01
.67 N.S.
*
N.S. stands for not significant
Exclusion of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits
When the judges of the fourth and fifth circuits are excluded from
the computation of medians for the judge groups, Nixon appointees outside
the south have higher median scores than non-Nixon Republicans on the
fiscal 1973 cases which included unanimous decisions, and markedly higher
scores than the Republicans on the non-unanimous cases, as can be seen in
Table 30. The median scores for Democrats remained about the same (63.5)
for the 1973 cases but rose to 1.23 on the non-unanimous cases, as can be
seen from Table 30. These findings, like those in the aggregate analysis,
support the view that it was primarily in the southern and District of
Columbia circuits, where the Nixon Administration had a relatively free
hand in the selection process, that the Nixon Administration best fulfilled
its campaign promises. It is possible that the greater "conservatism" of
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non-Nixon Republicans outside the South as compared to Nixon appointees
outside the South, can be explained by the greater age of the former
group, all of whom were appointed before 1960.
TABLE 29
MEDIAN SCORES OF JUDGE GROUPS: FOURTH AND
FIFTH CIRCUITS EXCLUDED
Democrats Republ leans
Nixon
Appointees
Diff. Between
Nix. & Rep.
All
Cases
1973
63.5
.43
.46
.03
Non-
Unan.
Cases
1.23
.46
.63
.17
Median Scores of Protestants and non-Protestants:
Controlling for Party
When Protestants and non-Protestants of the same political party
are compared, differences still emerge between the different religious
groups, as can be seen from Table 31. Democratic non-Protestants had
higher median scores than Democratic Protestants and Republican non-
Protestants, and Republican non-Protestants had higher median scores than
Republican Protestants on the non-unanimous cases, although their scores
were identical on the 1973 cases. Religion then was an important factor
in explaining differences in voting behavior within as well as between
judge groups, a finding consistant with the partial correlation analysis.
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TABLE 30
MEDIAN SCORES OF PROTESTANTS AND NON-PROTESTANTS COMPARED-
POLITICAL PARTY HELD CONSTANT
^^^^^^^^^
Prot
Democrats
Non-Prot. Diff.
Republ icans
Prot. Non-Prot. Diff.
1973
Cases
.56 .72
.16
.45
.46
.00
1970-73
Cases
.88 1.31
.43
.57 1.11
.54
In conclusion, the medians tests as well as the composite scores of
the judge groups, suggest that attitudinal cleavages underlie at least
some of the observed differences in judicial voting behavior on the
Courts of Appeals. However, the bloc analysis as well as the correlation
analysis suggest that the Nixon Administration failed to appoint a mono-
lithic and cohesive group of "law and order" judges to the Courts of
Appeals. In order to explore this issue further, the next chapter focuses
on doctrinal positions taken by the judges in cases involving the law of
confessions and admissions.
CHAPTER V
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS JUDGES IN CRIMINAL CASES
INVOLVING COERCED CONFESSIONS
A substantial segment of the federal judiciary may justifiablybelieve that the Supreme Court went too far in (the Miranda)decision and that the specificity of the procedural safeguardsprescribed by it has had the effect of creating an unnecessary
straitjacket that should be loosened to permit use of custodial
statements voluntarily given, even though the interrogations
have failed to touch all the bases prescribed by Miranda. But
any modification of Midanda must come from the Supreme Court or
by constitutional amendment. Until then we are bound by that
decision.
--Nixon second circuit court appointee Mansfield dissenting
in United States v. Collins
, 562 F. 2d. 792 (1972), p. 801.
What makes this case exceptional is that the nation's highest
ranking law enforcement officer, the then Attorney General, saw
fit to lash out publicly at the panel decision while the
Government's petition for rehearing en banc was pending before
the court. In a speech delivered to the National District
Attorney's Association, the Attorney General singled it out as
"case number one" in his explanation of what he unfortunately
sees as the public's loss of confidence in the ability of the
courts to dispense justice. I had understood that the Depart-
ment of Justice's professed policy was, wisely, to refrain from
comment on pending cases and to make its argument in court. The
Attorney General's deviation from that sensible rule clearly
endangers the integrity of the judicial process.
--Truman appointee David Bazelon of the District of Columbia
circuit dissenting in United States v. Frazier 476 F. 2d.
(1973), pp. 901-2.
It has been shown in the preceding chapters that the Nixon
Administration possessed both the desire and the opportunity to change
judicial policy on criminal issues. Moreover, it has also been shown
that Nixon appointees to the United States Courts of Appeals cast a
greater proportion of their aggregate votes in criminal cases against
the accused than did appointees of previous administrations, and it has
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been suggested that differences in the voting behavior of the three groups
may be accounted for, in part, by possible attitudinal cleaveages among
them. However, bloc analysis of individual circuits reveals that the
Nixon appointees to the Courts of Appeals apparently lack the attitudinal
cohesiveness of Nixon appointees to the Supreme Court and appear to be
attitudinally a more diverse group than his appointeesto that high Court.
The analysis to follow will explore this issue further by comparing the
doctrinal responses of Nixon appointees to each other and to non-Nixon
Democrats and Republicans. The issue to be examined, allegations of
coerced confession or statement, was the most politically charged of the
criminal issues in the vociferous debate of the 1960si and, as the quotes
that precede the text of this chapter indicate, the judges of the Courts
of Appeals were not oblivious to the political pressures surrounding
confession issues in the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, exclusion
of confessions from criminal trials in the United States is not of recent
origin nor is the controversy over It, which dates back to the Supreme
Court's 1943 decision in McNabb v. United States^ and has recurred Inter-
mittently since then. Prior to Moore v. Dempsey^ (1923), exclusion of
coerced confessions was based on the long established common law rule
that coerced confessions were untrustworthy evidence. However, in that
case the Supreme Court fashioned a "fair trial" rule based on "the
totality of the circumstances" to govern court review of state cases under
^
McNabb v. United States 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
^Moore v. Dempsey 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
3
Otis Stephens, The Supreme Court and Confessions of Guilt
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1973), p. 17.
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the fourteenth amendment. Then in 1936 in the case of Brown v.
MLssissi££i,^ the court specifically included coerced confessions as
violating the fundamental fairness doctrine. It was not until the mid
nineteen-sixties that the court was to tie the exclusion of confessions
rationale for both state and federal cases to, first, the sixth amend-
ment's right to counsel, 5 and second, to the fifth amendment's prohibi-
tion against compelled self-incrimination.^
The essence of the Court's early attempts to operate under the
trusthworthiness and fairness doctrines was the effort to decide whether
the confession was truly voluntary (apparently, no one at that time was
suggesting that all use of confessions should be prohibited). In the
early cases, including the aforementioned Moore v. Dempsey and Brown v.
Mississippi, this effort was not particularly difficult as the cases
often involved obvious physical coercion.'^ Later when the Court was to
confront more subtle techniques of extraction short of physical torture
that pervaded the law enforcement techniques of much of the nation, the
decisions were to be legally and politically more difficult. "Justice"
in these cases would be more elusive and the social consequence of
judicial action potentially greater.
The problem with the voluntariness standard as a guide to court
action was, according to some critics, its subjectivity and therefore
unpredictability as a guide to law enforcement officers and lower courts.
^Brown V. Mississippi
, 296 U.S. 278 (1936).
^Escobedo v. Illinois
, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
^
Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 444 (1966).
''Stephens, 1oc. cit.
.
Chapter 3.
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Generally a determination of voluntariness or coercion involved a balanc-
ing of police conduct against the individual's capacity to resist. One
solution, it seemed, to avoiding the voluntariness test was prompt
arraignment so .hat a neutral magistrate might inform a suspect of his
rights, including silence and counsel, and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provided for arraignment "without unnecessary delay." In 1943
the Supreme Court seized on that provision to throw out a confession
without questioning its voluntariness. ^ Thus it embarked on a quest to
avoid the more discretionary case-by-case approach to confessions that
was to lead eventually, at the high tide of its effort, to Miranda v.
Arizona. Some Congressmen reacted immediately and with hostility to the
McNabb decision, thus initiating the long political struggle with members
of Congress over the law of confessions which was to reach an intense peak
in 1957 and 1958, continue through the nineteen-sixties, pouring over into
the arena of presidential politics in 1954 and 1968, until it finally
began to subside with the election of President Nixon, the exit of Justices
Fortas and Warren, the first Nixon appointments to the Court, and the
gradual retreat of the court itself on certain aspects of criminal
procedure.
The McNabb decision was followed in 1957 by the closely akin Mai lory
v. ilDited States ,^ which affirmed it. But these were federal, not state,
cases and the federalism issue so volatile in other issue areas handled by
the Court during the nineteen-fifties had not yet been broached with
regard to criminal procedures. The first stroke of the court in regard to
^McNabb v. United States, loc. cit.
^Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
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confession cases was the Escobedo decision of 1954 which extended the
right to assistance of counsel back to the time when a suspect was being
interrogated. Once again the Court threw out a confession without
questioning its voluntariness. Escobedo
, however, did not lay down a
detailed procedure that police must follow before and during interroga-
tion. Thus it was left to Miranda v. United States
, which followed two
years later, to bureaucratize the law of confession and admissions by
outlining a detailed procedure for police to follow prior to and during
the questioning of a suspect.
The Miranda decision provided the following general guidelines:
First, the suspect was to be warned that he had a right to remain silent
and that anything he said could be used against him.^^ Second, he was
to bo told that he had a right to consult an attorney before and during
questioning and that if he could not afford it, an attorney would be
appointed for himJ^ Third, the suspect could waive his right to
silence and an attorney (in practice over ninety percent did) but the
waiver must be "knowing," "intelligent," and there was to be a "heavy
1
2
burden" on the prosecutor to prove such. Finally, even after effecting
a waiver, the suspect was to reserve the option of reasserting his right
to silence and counsel at any point in the subsequent questioning, and
1
3
the police were to respect it. Ostensibly, if these procedures were
followed by the policy both in spirit and letter, courts could assume
^ '^Miranda v. Arizona , op. cit. , pp. 468-9,
^hbid., p. 470-472.
^^ibid., p. 475.
l^Ibid,
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that confessions and admissions obtained thereafter were voluntary, and
could avoid the older and supposedly more subjective balancing of police
methods against individual capacity to resist. Miranda, however, despite
,its ambitious attempt to create a more uniform objective and settled law
of confessions and admissions, contained many seeds of continuing contro-
versy. When was a suspect to be considered "in custody"? Exactly what
were the police to say to a suspect to implement the decision? Were
written warnings sufficient? What did the prosecution have to prove to
demonstrate "knowing and intelligent" waiver of rights? What standard
of proof was to prevail in lower court hearings on motions to suppress
confessions, beyond a reasonable doubt or preponderance of the evidence?
Did an assertion of right to counsel or silence or a refusal to waive
rights preclude further police attempts to interrogate? Once a waiver
had been obtained did subsequent interrogation sessions require new
warnings? Could a tainted confession inadmissible in the state's direct
case be used for secondary purposes such as impeachment of a defendant's
in-court testimony, or as an aid in gathering evidence which would be
admissible?
Complicating further the political and legal picture that Miranda
had attempted to simplify was the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
14
Act of 1968, which purportedly reversed both the Mai lory and Miranda
decisions and reestablished the voluntariness test as the prevailing
standard in the law of confessions and admissions. On firm ground with
Mai lory , which had been based on the Court's construction of a
^^Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, (1968), 18 U.S.C.,
Sections 921-928.
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Congressional statute, the act v;as of doubtful constitutionality in
attempting to reverse
.Miranda, which was based on the constitutional
strictures of the sixth and particularly the fifth amendment to the
^ federal constitution. Ramsey Clark, then Attorney General under
President Johnson, ordered his staff to ignore it. However, when
John Mitchell became Attorney General under the Nixon Administration,
he advised Justice Department attorneys to adhere to Miranda procedures
but to introduce even tainted confessions if agents had inadvertently
fallen short of those standards
.""^
^^ii^anda thus raised new questions, many of which remained
unanswered by the Supreme Court. Numerous studies have been conducted
concerning the impact of the Miranda decision on the police. Few
studies, however, have focused on the responses of lower court judges
to the issues raised by Miranda and its progeny. Thus one of the
purposes of this chapter is to identify some of the doctrinal responses
of the Judges of the United States Courts of Appeals to confession
issues posed during the 1972 term and before. Second, an attempt will be
made to ascertain whether there are significant doctrinal differences
between the Nixon appointments and previously appointed Democrats and
Republicans on confession issues.
'^Stephens, op. cit. , p. 164.
^^Ibid., Chapter 7.
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Statements Taken from Suspects After Assertion of Rightsto Silence or Attorney
The central issue posed in most Miranda confession cases during the
years fiscal 1970 through 1973 concerned the voluntariness of a waiver
Of rights and what police conduct was permitted in securing such a waiver.
Fred Graham in his analysis of the Miranda case and its impact was undoubt-
edly correct in observing that Miranda had only pushed the voluntariness
question back- from the confession itself to the waiver of rights. ""^
Several cases presented these waiver issues to the appeals judges during
the 1972 term and earlier: A second circuit case, United States v. Collins^ ^
involved a nineteen-year-old heroin addict who three times declined to
answer questions before finally signing a waiver and confessing, to bank
robbery. Judge LumbardJ^ joined by Hayes, with Mansfield dissenting, held
that Collins' decision to waive his rights "was not made involuntarily."
We do not believe that anything decided in Miranda was meant
to prohibit police officers from ever asking a defendant to
reconsider his refusal to answer questions.
. .Such a rule finds
no support in the fifth amendment, nor, fairly read, in Miranda
itself, nor in common sense.
Here Collins was not subjected to any immediate re-
interrogration but only asked to reconsider his refusal to
answer. So long as such reconsideration is urged in a careful,
non-coercive manner at not too great length and in a context
that a defendant's assertion of his rights not to speak will be
honored, it does not violate the Miranda mandate. ^0
"Fred Graham, The Self Inflicted Wound (New York: MacMillan, 1970),
p. 182.
1 R
'
"United States v. Collins
, 462 F. 2d. 792 (1972).
^^Lumbard (R, .47), Hayes (D, .82), Mansfield (N, 1.33). "R" refers
to non-Nixon Republicans, "D" to non-Nixon Democrats and "N" to Nixon
appointees. The number represents the score on at least six non-unanimous
cases.
^^United States v. Col 1 ins
,
op. cit.
, p. 797.
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According to Judge Lumbard, "Collins had been told and could see
that if he [Collinsl told them [the agents| to stop they would. "21
Mansfield, however, in dissent, called for reversal of Collins'
conviction because he found it "difficult to conceive of a clearer
violation of the plain and unequivocal prescription laid down by Miranda
than that revealed here. "22
Strict and literal interpretation of the Supreme Court's
directions in Miranda would have required the government
thereafter to cease efforts to interrogate Collins, at least
until he was represented by counsel. 23
Pointing to the fact that on the morning of the confession Collins
had refused to answer questions at ten and ten-thirty before agreeing at
eleven, Mansfield found it "not surprising that a nineteen-year-old
addict broke down.
"
Another second circuit case. United States v. Massimo , 24 involved a
simiiar issue. Judge Hayes, 2^ writing also for Moore and Smith, held that
the police have the privilege of "asking a defendant to reconsider his
refusal to answer questions," and that such a practice did not amount to
a coerced waiver.
In Hendricks v. Swenson, an eighth circuit case, Judge Heaney,27
2hbid .
^^
Ibid
. , p. 800.
2^ Ibid
. , p. 799.
^^United States v. Massimo , 463 F. 2d. 1171 (1972)
25MoGre (R, .05), Smith (D, 1.83).
^^Mendricks v. Swenson , 455 F., 2d. 503 (1972).
27Heaney (D, 2.00).
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in a dissenting opinion, adhered to the view that fliranda required that
the suspect not be questioned further after declining to make a state-
ment. Judge Van Pelt, with whom Judge Gibson agreed.^S however, held the
waiver voluntary under the circumstances. Thus in these three cases the
majority employed the old voluntariness test based on the totality of the
circumstances, whereas the dissenters attempted to avoid that test through
their reading of the Miranda decision.
Police questioning after an as.pr tion of ri ghts by the acr.i.pd in
the sixth circuit case of Combs v. Win^o,^^ however, a unanimous panel
consisting of Judges McCree, Weick and Peck,30 reversed the conviction of
the defendant who had requested but was denied, aid of counsel before
making a statement. Interrogating officers had agreed to stop question-
ing but then showed the accused an incriminating ballistics report. On
seeing the report, Combs "broke down and confessed." The appellate panel
held that the showing of the ballistics report was really
"a/nothef/
question without a question mark..."
...according to Miranda interrogation must cease when a
defendant requests an attorney .. .once defendant has asserted
that he wants to exercise his rights, a statement taken
after that cannot be other than the product of compulsion.
.
.31
Similarly in the seventh circuit case of United States v. Crisp
,
28
Gibson (D, .18), Van Pelt (District Judge).
29
Combs V. Wingo
, 455 F. 2d. 97 (1972).
""""McCree (D, 1.80), Weick (R, .00), Peck (D, .38)
3^ Combs
,
op. cit.
, p. 99.
^^
United States v. Crisp , 435 F. 2d. 354 (1970).
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Judges Curings, Hastings and Fairchild,^^ condemned a confession taken
after the suspect had asserted his right to silence. Crisp signed a
waiver but then said he did not want to talk about the bank robbery. The
agent then questioned him about his actions just before and after the
robbery. Writing for the panel, Cummings held that
Both the letter and the spirit of.
..Miranda call for condem-nation of this. ..police conduct... NoFlT-eTTthe slightest
circumvention or avoidance may be tolerated. The rule thatinterrogation must cease, in whole or in part, in accordance
with the expressed wishes of the suspect mean just that and
nothing less. Once the privilege has been asserted, aninterrogator must not be permitted to seek its retraction
total or otherwise. Nor may he effectively disregard the'privilege by unreasonably narrowing its intended scope. 34
The fifth circuit took an intermediate position with regard to the
issue of the taking of a statement after an assertion of rights. In
United States v. Anthony, appellant contested his theft conviction,
arguing that a statement taken from him in the absence of counsel after he
had requested counsel had to be suppressed independently of the issue of
voluntariness. A unanimous panel consisting of Judges Brown, Goldberg and
36Morgan, held in a per curiam decision that the continued conversation
with the arresting officer had been initiated by the appellant and thus
was admissible as evidence.
In Hopkins wc held that if an accused person initiates the
conversation his statements do not result from interrogation
and are therefore admissible. ^7
^^Cummings (D, .57), Hastings (R, .40), Fairchild (D, 1.23)
34
Cris£, op. cit ., p. 357.
^^
United States v. Anthony, 474 F. 2d 770 (1970).
Brown (D, .92), Goldberg (D, 1.78), Morgan (D, .67).
^^Anthony
,
op. cit.
, p. 773.
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In the Hoakins^S ^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^.^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
had been joined by Tuttle and Wisdom^^ in rejecting the contention that
no statement could be taken after a refusal to sign a waiver. In still
another case, United State^ v. Phe]^,^^ Goldberg was joined by Dyer^l
and a district judge in reiterating the Hopkins position that voluntary
statements were admissible evidence even after refusals to sign waivers.
Consistent with the Hopkins doctrine, a unanimous panel of
42Judge Thornberry, Brown, and Morgan in United States v. Priest^ ^ held
that police questioning of Priest in his hospital room after his refusal
to sign a waiver "until after seeing an attorney" was forbidden by
^ii^anda even though Priest had talked freely and voluntarily.
If such a request is disregarded and the questioning proceeds,
any statement taken thereafter, must be presumed a product
of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.
In contrast to the fifth circuit, a unanimous panel in the fourth
circuit upheld ( per curiam ) appellant's conviction even though he had
refused to sign a waiver and had not initiated the ensuing statement.
Judges Boreman, Craven and Butzner,^^ held that Thompson had admitted
^
^Hopkins v. United States, 433 F. 2d. 1041 (1970).
"^^Tuttle (R, 1.80), Wisdom (R, 1.30).
^^United States v. Phelps
, 433 F. 2d. 245 (1970).
^'oyer (D, .40).
^^Thornberry (D, 1 .20).
^^United States v. Priest
, 409 F. 2d, 491 (1969).
^^
Ibid
. , p. 792.
^^Boreman (R, .80), Craven (D, .88), Butzner (D, 1.56).
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that he understood his rights and "thereafter freely and voluntarily
answered questions . "'^^
Three positions, then, are discernible in the preceding cases:
(1) No statement can be taken from a suspect after refusal to sign a
waiver of rights. This position, adhered to in the sixth and seventh
circuits, was espoused by eight judges; five Democrats, two Republicans
and one Nixon appointee. This position is most closely associated with
the Miranda precedent's attempt to supersede the old voluntariness test
with an objective, rule. (2) A second position taken by the fifth
circuit would allow the taking of statements from suspects who had
refused to waive their rights as long as the suspect had initiated the
further conversation, but it would condemn statements taken as a result
of further police questioning after a suspect's refusal to waive his
rights. (3) The third position, most closely associated with the second
and fourth circuits, would allow continued police attempts to interrogate
a suspect even after he had refused to waive his rights, as long as such
further police efforts were non-coercive as determined by the circum-
stances. Six Democrats and three Republicans took this position.
Although there were three alternative interpretations of Miranda
in the eight cases just discussed, dissent occurred in only two cases
(in the second and eighth circuits). In other circuits such disparate
types as Judges McCree (score 1.80), Peck (score .38), and Weick (.00) of
the sixth circuit, Fairchild (1.23) and Hastings (.40) in the seventh
circuit, and Goldberg (1.78), Morgan (.67) and Dyer (.40) in the fifth
^^
United States v. Thompson 417 F. 2d. 196 (1970)
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circuit, were able to agree on a particular doctrinal position, despite
the fact that some unanimously decided cases presented opportunities for
judicial disagreement. Moreover, there was no evidence that judges were
concerned about settling acknowledged inter-circuit conflict.
Interrogation Without the Knowledge of a Retained Attorney
A similar and troublesome issue for the judges in fiscal 1973 and
earlier concerned the questioning of accused persons without the know-
ledge of their retained attorneys. Four cases involving three circuits
dealt with this issue, which is another form of the first question (which
involved continued attempts to interrogate after an assertion of rights).
The third circuit faced this issue in United States v. Cobbs .^"^
Cobbs was visited in jail by police officers who did not inform his
attorney. He agreed to waive his rights and confess. The court of
appeals, in an opinion for the court written by visiting district judge
Bechtle joined by appeals judges Rosenn and Hunter, condemned the ethics
of the police action but upheld its constitutionality citing the seventh
49
circuit s decision in United States v. Springer
.
In a dictum Bechtle admitted that constitutional rights are
endangered, because
The relationship between lawyer and client risks significant
erosion and the ability of counsel to effectively represent
his client is seriously jeopardized when this kind of inter-
rogation ensues.
^^United States v. Cobbs , 481 F. 2d. 197 (1973).
^^Bechtle (District Judge), Rosenn (N, 1.17), Hunter (N, 1.00)
^^
United States v. Springer 460 F. 2d. 1344 (1972).
^Qlbid., p. 200.
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However, he refused to reverse the conviction, and suggested safeguards:
These risks would be... reduced if... the district courtwould expect... the prosecution to inclu de c'ihatthe accused prior to making a statement, specif^cali/
acknowledged that he was aware that he was represented bv
^ an attorney... however we do not require such ev?dence^^
Although the third circuit refused to impose this higher standard
of proof of waiver under these circumstances, it acknowledged the seventh
circuit's ruling that "...there is a higher standard imposed to show
waiver of the presence of counsel once counsel has been appointed. "^^
This position of the seventh circuit, taken in United States v. Springer
,
was by a divided panel with judges Pell and Cummings for the majority and
53
Stevens dissenting, upholding Springer's bank robbery conviction.
Police officers had visited Springer in jail for the purpose of having
him correct and sign a typed version of an earlier oral confession. There
were no verbal warnings at the time and no further police questioning.
Springer was given a warning card containing a waiver which he read and
signed. He then signed the confession. His attorney had not been
informed of the visit.
Pell, writing for himself and Cummings, held that there was "no per
se rule that talking to a man without his attorney would vitiate a confes-
sion or that the mere reading of a waiver form was an inadequate Miranda
54
warning." Since there was no per se rule. Pell deferred to the district
S^ibid.
^
^Ibid
., p. 199.
^^Pell (N, .53), Stevens (N, .91)
54
Spri nger
, p. 1352.
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was
court's finding that Springer's waiver was voluntary because there v,
substantial evidence to support that conclusion.
We are not prepared to say that the evidence was not enoughto give substantial support to the decision. We do this
ZIL f recognize that there is a higher standardimposed to show waiver of the presence of counsel once
counsel has been appointed than before...
Stevens, however, held that the visit (by agents) to Springer's
cell without informing his attorney was "such a departure from procedural
'regularity' as to violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment. "^6
A later case^^ involving this issue in the seventh circuit resulted
in three more judicial responses to the problem. Police had questioned
appellant Durham four timas after his arrest and preliminary hearing with-
out telling his retained counsel. Judge Swygert^^ condemned this practice
as forbidden by Messiah v. United States
, which had been applied retro-
actively by Mcleod v. Oh^lo.^*^
I read Massiah to bar the admissibility of the statements
obtained here since the government had initiated adversary
judicial proceedings against Durham prior to the time the
statements were obtained.
. .it (the government) could not,
in my opinion, permissibly interview the defendant without
advising his counsel. °'
Massiah, however, had involved a post-indictment confession. Swygert
^
^Ibid .
^^
Ibid
., p. 1355.
^^United States v. Durham
, 475 F. 2d. 208 (1973).
Swygert (D, 1.44).
^^
Massiah v. United States , 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
Mcleod V. Ohio , 85 S. Ct. 1556, 378 U.S. 582. (1965).
^^Durham, p. 211.
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applied it to any situation where adversary judicial proceedings had been
initiated. Swygert's reading of Massiah would have avoided the waiver
issue by ruling that agents can never question an accused person without
informing retained counsel. He would have awarded a new trial in this
case and forbidden the use of the confession in the new proceedings.
Judge Pell was equally troubled by the ethical issues involved, but
refused to jettison the voluntariness test.
To the extent that the opinion of Chief Judge Swygert rests
upon a per se rule that would exclude confessions when counsel
is not notified of or present at the interrogation, I dissent
from the opi nion. . .Not withstanding the existence of counsel...
a defendant may waive the presence and assistance of that
counsel, provided it very clearly appears that the accused
deliberately and understandi ngly chose to forego that assis-
tance.^^
Pell's position had changed, however, from his opinion in the earlier
Spri nger case.
...when the interrogation takes place after knowledge of the
existence of counsel the situation calls for a ventilated
determination that there was a deliberate and knowing
waiver. The burden in this factual situation on the prosecu-
tion is a heavy one, but I do not agree with the implicit
premise of Swygert's opinion that it is an impossible
accomplishment. . .1 would remand for a hearing on the matter
of voluntariness."^
Judge Castle^^ disagreed with both Pell and Swygem, and was the
only one of the three who would have affirmed the conviction. In response
to Pell he argued that since this was a 1961 conviction, Miranda did not
apply and therefore the pre-Mi randa rule of voluntariness of the confession
62
4bid.
Ibid
. ,
p. 212,
63i
^^Castle (R, insufficient voters upon which to compute score).
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under "a totality of circumstances" rather than the post-Mi^
"volun-
tariness of waiver" doctrine, was controlling.
...even if Durham could prove his waiver was not knowinaand voluntary his failure to point to any other proof of
Ei'Xy^ ei ^^^^ confession admissible under p;e
Thus Castle adhered to the older test of admissibility of confessions.
Pell was operating under his interpretation of the more stringent Miranda
rules and Swygert under even stricter rules which he claimed were
imposed by Massjah and McLeod. Pell and Swygert formed the majority since
they were able to agree to remand the case for a lower court determination
of the factual questions concerning the circumstances under which the
confession was signed.
Finally, in the 1970 term case of United States v. Crisp , Judges
Cummings, Hastings and Fairchild^^ "declined to read into McLeod any hold-
ing that after indictment a defendant may never effectively waive his
right to counsel
. .
.
"^^
Although agents could have informed Crisp's attorney...
failurg to do so does not require a reversal in this
case."^
As with the earlier issues concerning continued questioning after
refusal of accused persons to waive their rights, both inter- and intra-
circuit conflict were evident in cases concerning police questioning without
^^Durham, p. 215.
United States v. Crisp , loc. cit.
^'^Fairchild (D, 1.23).
^
^Crisp
,
p. 358.
^^
Ibid
., p. 358-9.
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informing the retained attorney of the accused. Yet in two of the four
cases there was no dissent, despite the fact that the cases turned
exclusively on differing possible interpretations of the law.
More importantly for this study, four Nixon appointees, Rosenn and
Hunter in the third circuit, and Pell and Stevens in the seventh, split
three different ways on the issues just discussed. This finding further
reinforces the revelations of the bloc analysis that the Nixon appoin-
tees varied in their attitudes toward criminal issues from circuit to
circuit and within individual circuits.
Failure of Police to Honor Requests for Counsel
A number of similar cases dealt with confessions obtained after
assertions of right to counsel had not been honored by the police, the
issue addressed in the landmark Escobedo v. Illinois .'^" In United States
V. Howards^^ in the District of Columbia circuit, appellant Howards had
been arrested in North Carolina for robbery and felony murder. After
being read his rights he said he "didn't know whether he should get an
attorney in Raleigh or wait until he got back to Washington, D.C."''^
The arresting officer said that he couldn't advise Howards and then
showed him a confession signed by three accomplices, a familiar police
interrogation tactic used in the Escobedo case. Howards then agreed to
waive his rights and confess. On appeal from his conviction he argued
that Miranda required all questioning to cease after an assertion of
^^Escobedo v. Illinois, loc. cit.
^^
United States v. Howards , 470 F. 2d. 406 (1973).
^^Ibid.
,
p. 408.
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rights. A unanimous panel consisting of Nixon appointee Judge MacKinnon
and Democrat McGowan, with Denocrat Leventhal^S concurring, held that
Howards had not expressed an unequivocal desire for an attorney. "'Being
undecided about an attorney," they wrote, "is substantially different from
making a request for an attorney. "^4 j^e court also noted that informing
Howards of the confessions of his fellow suspects was not coercive in this
case because the information was true. Leventhal in his concurrence,
however, had "some difficulty with pursuing a man who says he wants an
attorney through the means of advising him of the confessions of the
others in the hope that he might be led, as he was in this case, to say
he wanted to tell what he knew and respond to the question. "'^^ In this respect
he quoted Miranda :
If he (the suspectl indicates in any manner and at any stage
of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney
before speaking there can be no questioning. 76
Leventhal, however, voted to affirm the conviction because Howard's
former trial experience and a second waiver of rights to a magistrate gave
him "no doubt" that the confession was voluntary. Thus, although Leventhal
gave lip service to Miranda and to a per se rule of exclusion of confes-
sions, he ultimately, like the others on the panel, employed a voluntari-
77
ness test based on an examination of the relevant circumstances.
^^MacKinnon (N, .20), McGowan (D, .71), Leventhal (D, 1.06)
^^Howards, p. 407.
^^
Ibid ., p. 410,
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
112
In the fifth circuit an unanimous panel with Judge Gewin^^ writing
for Goldberg and Dyer upheld the conviction of a Colombian citizen
arrested in Florida who had requested to see the Colombian Consul but
who had waived his rights and confessed after that request was denied by
arresting officers. Gewin wrote that
The assertion of a desire to see the Colombian Consul was at
most an ambiguous request the motivation for which was unknown
It does not show the specific connotation necessarily involvedm the request for counsel. To conclude that such requests
would invoke Miranda protection would unnecessarily and
universally broaden the purpose of the Miranda decision. 79
In the eighth circuit case of lijilt£d_S±ateL v. Young, 80 unanimous
panel of Judges Duffy, Cummings and Sprecher^^ held that police failure to
honor Young's request for counsel did not vitiate his subsequent sponta-
neous confession to a postal inspector, because the police themselves
had not interrogated Young and the postal inspector was part of a dis-
tinct investigative body. Therefore, Young's early assertion of his
rights did not invalidate a later waiver.
In the ninth circuit case of United States v. La Monica , Judges
oo
Goodwin and Merriir^ and District Judge Skopil upheld appellant's con-
viction even though a statement had been taken and used after an assertion
of rights. Police had not questioned LaMonica further after he had
^^Gewin (D, .86).
^^ United States v. Arroyave
, 477 F. 2d. 154 (1973), p. 162.
^'^
United States v. Young , 471 F. 2d. 109 (1972).
^^Duffy (D, .80), Sprecher (N, .33).
^^United States v. LaMonica 472 F. 2d. 580 (1973)..
^^Goodwin (N, .00), Merrill (R, 1.36), Skopil (District Judge).
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expressed the desire to retain counsel and remain silent. Instead they
had taken him to an office for inventory of his personal possessions.
In the course of this routine "booking" procedure, a police officer find-
ing a receipt in La Monica's pocket asked, "What does this mean?"^^
La Monica replied that he had retained an attorney before his trip "just
85
in case something went wrong." The admission was used at La Monica's
trial. The appellate panel held the statement admissible because the
policeman's question had not been intended for the purpose of obtaining
an incriminating statement from the suspect. The judges pointed out
that La Monica had not been subjected to persistent and coercive inter-
rogation and that there had been no resort to guile or trickery. Thus
the judges in this case clearly leaned toward the voluntariness test in
their justification of their decision.
In a similar fifth circuit case, Dempsey v. Wainwright
,
Dempsey
had requested an attorney after his arrest and two hours later refused
to sign a waiver. He was not supplied an attorney at that time, and
later said to a police officer, "I did it but you will never prove it."
This statement was used in his trial and he challenged its admission on
87
appeal. Judges Wisdom and Roney voted to affirm the conviction on
88
procedural grounds, but Rives dissented, asking the district court to
hold a hearing to determine whether Dempsey 's statement was a result of
^^La Monica
, p. 581
^^Ibid.
85
Dempsey v. Wainwright 471 F. 2d. 604 (1972)
^^Roney (N, .36).
^^Rives (D, 1.69).
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the failure to provide counsel within a reasonable time after his reqest.
Appellant's request for counsel should have been honored
n t e subTecred 0 ^r-'-'r?' appenan^luld
^Uhout'thfad\1se°orcounsel!8r'"^ ' ''"^'''^^ ^^^^--^
Ambiguous or Contradictory Statements of Defendant Rights
Another issue that split the judges during fiscal 1973 concerned
the use of ambiguous or contradictory statements of defendant rights by
arresting officers. In Umteiitatei v. Massimo^Q second circuit judges
Hayes, Moore, and Smith upheld the validity of a police warning which
included the statement, "We have no way of furnishing you with a lawyer
but one will be appointed for you if you wish, if a^d when you go to
court. "^^ This statement followed immediately the traditional warning of
right to counsel before and during questioning.^^ Hayes reasoned:
Massimo w.^s clearly warned that he could have a lawyer present
during the questioning. The only conclusion that Massino
would have been justified in reaching on the basis of the
warning was that since he was clearly entitled to have a lawyer
present during questioning and since no lawyer could now be
provided, he could not now be questioned. ^3
This opinion relies directly on the identical holding of the fifth
89
Mainwriqht
, p. 607.
90
United States v. Massimo, loc. cit.
91
Ibid
.
,
p. 1173.
92
The full warning is as follows: "You have the right both to a
lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to have him with
you during questioning. You have the same right to the advice and
presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have
no way of furnishing you a lawyer but one will be appointed for you,
if you wish, if and when you go to court." p. 1173.
^^Ibid.
, p. 1174.
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circuit in United States v. Lacx,94 , ,,3^ ^^^.^^^ ^.^^^^ ^^^^^
There, Judges Wisdom, Coleman, and Simpson found that the above warn-
ing administered by federal agents comported with Miranda requirements
because the fact
that the attorney was not to be appointed until later seemsimmaterial since Lacy was informed that he had the right
to put off answering any questions until the time when hedid have an appointed attorney. 95
The seventh circuit case of United States ex^re}. Wijm^ ^'
96 •Twomey involved the use of an identical warning by Indiana and
Illinois police. However, a divided panel. District Judge Dillin, writ-
ing with the agreement of Judge Swygert, with Pell in dissent, condemned
the warnings because:
'''i'^^nda requires a clear and unequivocal warning to an accused...
We hold that the warning given here was not an effective and
express explanation. .. In one breath appellant was informed that
he had the right to appointed counsel during questioning. In
the next breath he was told that counsel could not be provided
until later... The entire warning is..., at best, misleading
and confusing and, at worst, constitutes a subtle temptation
to the unsophisticated, indigent accused to forego the right
to counsel at this critical moment... The practice of police
interrogation of an accused, after informing him that counsel
cannot be provided at the present time, is a practice anticipated
and expressly prohibited by the Miranda decision.
Pell, in dissent, lamented that although "there was little doubt that
the defendant committed the homicide.
..
(he) may be freed because of non-
98
compliance with an overly technical application of the Miranda rule.'
^
^United States v. Lacy 446 F. 2d. 511 (1971).
^^
Ibid
., p. 513.
^^United States ex. rel . Williams v. Twomey 467 F. 2d., 1248 (1972).
97.
Ibid
., p. 1250-51
58lbid., p. 1253.
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I cannot agree... that the Miranda warnings must convev tn
unse^'fre' nd now" ^ govLn.en^furn?sh^d'°
^f.f^nl Z ^^^^ means the police
po e statlonJ'dr'.T ^^^^^^^tic statement beca enc ations do not furnish government counsel Tf ni-ls contended that the accused.
.
'did. TOe"t' ^oranswer questions on a voluntary basis/there would beindeed a heavy burden upon the state to demonstrate
i^n^bu^de^ ^^^^^-^-^ -
Pell would have remanded the case for a hearing on the voluntari-
ness Issue and again placed himself in the "voluntariness plus" camp
wtih regard to waiver of rights. Finally, he admonished the police
to eliminate this source of constitutional challenge by revising their
warnings.
To summarize, this type of warning, clearly designed to nullify
the impact of Miranda and, it seems, in fairly widespread use at both
federal and state levels, was upheld by eight judges and condemned by
two, with one. Pell, in the intermediate position of not condemning the
warning but not affirming the conviction either. Thus over two thirds of
the circuit judges were found to have narrowly interpreted Miranda
standards, about the same proportion as with the other issues. Here
again, moreover, although the cases turned on different interpretations
of the law, two of three decisions were unanimous.
Another issue, involving warnings that seemed to suggest leniency
in return for a waiver of rights, was faced by panels on the fifth and
seventh circuits. In Frazier v. United States , a fifth circuit case
decided in fiscal 1971, Judges Rives, Wisdom and Rodbold, in a per curiam
99 Ibid.
100Frazier v. United States . 434 F. 2d. 934 (1971)
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decision, held that Frazier's confession was not made involuntary by
reason of the single fact that the F.B.I, agents told him that if he
cooperated with them his cooperation would be made known to the U.S.
Attorney, and that there might be some consideration given by the U.S.
Attorney but that the agent could make no promises. Standing alone,
wrote the court, this was not sufficient to establish that Frazier's
in-custody confession was involuntary.^*^^
The seventh circuit case United States v. Springer^ O^ presented
the identical issue to Judges Pell, Cummings and Stevens. In the course
of encouraging Springer, a bank robbery suspect, to confess, agents
(apparently as part of routine procedure) told Springer that the judge,
prosecutor and U. S. Commissioner would know of his willingness to
cooperate, "although they could make no promises." Springer then waived
his rights and confessed. Pell, writing for Cummings with apparently no
objection from Stevens (who dissented on other grounds) held that:
no public policy should castigate a confession of crime merely
because it may have been prompted by the hope that cooperation
might achieve or increase chances of a lenient sentence. '^^
All six judges then held that this particular statement was not
enough, taken alone, to vitiate a waiver.
In the second circuit a confession obtained through the promise of
reduced bail was upheld by Judges Lumbard, Kaufman and Hays, who relied
on the "voluntariness" of the waiver under the "totality of the circumstances."
^Q
^bid
., pp. 995-5.
^Q^United States v. Springer , loc. cit.
^°^Ibid.
, p. 1347.
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They held that Bram v. UnitelStatei"' ^4 which had held confessions
involuntary if "obtained by any direct or implied promises, however
slight," had not been applied by the Supreme Court in subsequent cases
-,with "wooden literalness" and that the Supreme Court had "made it clear
that the test of voluntariness was based on all the circumstances . "^^^
Adequacy of Written Warnings
Three cases dealt with the adequacy of written explanations of
Miranda warnings without oral additions. In the fifth circuit case of
United States v. Bailey ,^^^ Judges Goldberg, Brown and Morgan approved
the use of warnings presented in writing only. In the seventh circuit
case of United States v. Springer^ (already discussed with regard to
other issues), Judges Pell, Cummings and Stevens similarly held that
"certainly the fact that the warnings given were only by a written form
cannot be dispositive." In an earlier seventh circuit case. United
1 no
States V. Johnson , Judges Kiley, Castle and Kerner upheld a confession
involving the questionable verbal warning that the suspect "could have a
lawyer if and when he went to court" because appellant had signed a
correct written statement of his right. "Having signed the written
waiver form, without evidence to the contrary, he cannot now contend that
^Q^Bram v. United States , 18 Supreme Court 183 (1897)
^^^Case cite misplaced.
^^^
United States v. Bailey , 468 F. 2d. 652 (1972).
^^^United States v. Springer , loc. cit.
^^^United States v. Johnson, 426 F. 2d. 1172 (1972).
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he did not understand his rights. """^^
Other cases involved the absence of any warnings whatsoever in
police interrogations of American citizens in foreign countries. In
two cases decided in the fifth and ninth circuits judges agreed that
Miranda warnings were not required in foreign countries because the
policy purposes of Miranda to prevent third degree tactics could not be
affected in a foreign country by excluding the confessions from American
trials. The only question in these cases, said the judges, was whether
or not the confession was voluntary.
In the fifth circuit's Kilday v. U.S.^ ^^ a unanimous panel of
Judges Wisdom, Ainsworth, and Clark upheld the conviction of an appellant
who had been arrested and questioned in Argentina without Miranda^ warn-
ings. In the more controversial United States v. Trenary^^^ an American
citizen was questioned in Mexico with the aid of an American customs
official acting as an interpreter. Trenary, who was not aware that the
interpreter was an American official, was given no warnings and confessed.
Judges Chambers, Carter and Wright, in an unanimous per curiam opinion,
upheld the conviction pointing out that the American Customs agent had
only asked questions posed by the Mexican police and had asked no ques-
tions of his own. For precedent the court relied on United States v.
"^Q^
Ibid
., p. 1115.
^^^ Kilday v. United States . 481 F. 2d. 655 (1973).
^^^ United States v. Trenary , 433 F. 2d. 680 (1971).
^^^Chambers (R, .11), Carter (D, .06), Wright (N, .73).
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113Chavarna and United State^ v. Naaelberr^l 1 * decided in the ninth and
second circuits respectively.
In f^agel berry
,
decided in fiscal 1971, Judge Smith, who was joined
by Friendly and Hays, held that
The Miranda rule has no application in a case., where the
arrest and interrogation were by Canadian officers Th--
presence of an American officer should not destroy the
~
usefulness of evidence legally obtained on the ground that
methods of interrogation of another country, at least
equally civilized, may vary from ours.
In Chavarria, another fiscal 1971 case, Duniway, Carter and
Hufstedler were unwilling to apply Miranda to foreign interrogations
because of the "ineffectiveness" of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent
to foreign police methods.
In other cases involving a lack of Miranda warnings. Judges Hastie,
Van Dusen and McLaughlin of the third circuit upheld the confession and
conviction of a sixteen-year-old who had been questioned for two and a
half hours at midday without being informed of his rights to silence or
counsel, because the judges found that "under the circumstances" the
confession had not been coerced. However, this case stemmed from a 1961
pre-Miranda conviction.^ And in the second circuit case of United
States V. Gaynor ,^ ^ ^ Judges Kaufman, Anderson and Cakes overruled a lower
court's decision that a postal inspector was required to interrupt
^^^United States v. Chavarria , 443 F. 2d. 904 (1971).
^United States v. Nagelberry , 434 F. 2d. 585 (1970).
^^^ ibid
., p. 587.
^^^Loray v. Yeager , 446 F. 2d. 1360 (1971).
^United States v. Gaynor , 472 F. 2d. 899 (1973).
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Gaynor's spontaneous admissions with a warning "that he doesn't have to
make the statement and that if he does make it, it will be used against
118him." In an earlier interrogation session Gaynor, who was being
^•nvestigated for mail theft, had waived his rights. Only in the eleva-
tor, after the interrogation session, had he made his unsolicited
admissions.
Another second circuit case. United States v. Carnegl ia ,^^^ also
dealt with the issue of adequacy of warnings. Carneglia, arrested for
the theft of a tractor, claimed that he was not warned of his right to
counsel prior to his on-the-street interrogation. The arresting officer
claimed that "he had probably warned him," because he "usually did." In
an unanimous opinion. Judges Feinberg, Lumbard and Friendly affirmed the
conviction, reasoning that "Miranda was not a ritualistic formula."
Clearly the judges were relying on the older voluntariness test in
considering personal characteristics of the suspect and deciding that he
knew of his right to counsel even if not told of it by the police officer,
Feinberg acknowledged that Miranda had admonished that courts should not
"enquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his
rights without the warnings being given." However, he holds,
"(W)e do not think that evidence of subsequent conduct here
is irrelevant to show what Carnegl i
a
understood from warnings
which concededly were administered. '20
By focusing on what appellant understood rather than on what was said,
the panel, in this case, concededly engages in the kind of "speculation"
^^^Ibid. , 900.
^^^United States v. Carneglia , 468 F. 2d. 1084 (1972).
^^Ojbid., p. 122.
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about "the knowledge defendant possessed" that Miranda forbids.
Proof of Waiver
Four cases during fiscal 1973 involved the issue of government
proof that a waiver was "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary," as
required by Miranda. In Unitedjtates v. Fra_zier,121 decided by an en
banc District of Columbia Court, Frazier, a robbery suspect, first signed
a waiver and then began to confess to a series of robberies and shootings.
When, however, the interrogating officers began to take notes on his
confession the defendant objected, and he also objected to the officer's
offer to write up the confession and have him (Frazier) sign it. When
the officer put the pad away Frazier again began to talk freely and
confessed to the robbery, for which he was subsequently convicted.
Democratic Judges McGowan, Tamm and Leventhal joined Nixon appointees
MacKinnon, Robb and Wilkey in upholding the waiver, confession, and
conviction. McGowan, writing for the majority, relied on a psychologist's
testimony in the trial court that Frazier was capable of understanding,
and listed other factors such as the fact that Frazier had not been under
the influence, had been warned repeatedly and could hear adequately. Thus
his opinion reads very much like the rationales offered by previous judges
under the older voluntariness "under the totality of circumstances" test.
Judges Bazelon, joined by fellow Democrats Robinson and Wright,
dissented:
The record makes it crystal clear that the officers failed
to correct appellant's apparent misunderstanding by
explaining to him that an oral confession was as damaging
^^^United States v. Frazier, loc. cit.
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talking^'"f
because they were afraid he would stop
Bazelon continued:
The plain rule of Miranda requires us to reverse this convic-
tion. The Supreme Court has stated that a waiver of the riqht
against self incrimination is ineffective if there is anydoubt that it was made with full understanding of the conse-
quences. Since there is ample reason to doubt appellant's
understanding here, it was improper for police officers to
secure his statement, and error for the trial court to admit
In the eighth circuit case of Hendricks v. Swenson J^^ Judge
Heaney, in dissent, held that Swenson could not knowingly and intelli-
gently waive his rights and confess on videotape because, due to the
novelty of the medium, he could have no real understanding of the
implications of a waiver. Written confessions, argued Heaney, were a
blander medium familiar to a suspect. The court majority, however, held
that the videotape was not so novel or inherently incriminating as to
require special warnings. They compared videotape to the already
judicially sanctioned use of photographs in court.
In the ninth circuit case of United States v. Moreno J Judges
Hufstedler and Wright, and District Judge Lucas, held unanimously that
an express waiver of rights was not necessary where the suspect had
"indicated" that she understood her rights. The judges held per curiam
122ibid^.
, p. 122.
^23ibid_.
^^'^Hendricks v. Swenson , loc. cit.
^^^United States v. Moreno, 466 F. 2d. 1205 (1972)
^^^Hufstedler (D, 1.80).
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that courts could look at the particular case and imply a waiver where
circumstances warranted. Here a nineteen-year-old English-speaking,
Mexican-American woman,who had attended high school in the United States,
had been detained at the border, had been given proper warnings, had
signed a waiver, and had confessed to a narcotics charge.
Rights of Juveniles
Three cases dealt with the rights of juveniles in confession cases
and divided panels in the seventh and eighth circuits. In United States v
Fowler ,'^^ Judge Kiley, joined by Nixon appointee Stevens, with visiting
appeals judge and Nixon appointee Kilkenny dissenting, held that full
Miranda warnings must be given to juveniles and that a failure to warn
of the right to silence was a defective warning under the Miranda rules.
Further, Kiley strongly suggested that the presence of an attorney might
be an essential requisite to a voluntary waiver in juvenile confession
cases. Kilkenny, however, "doubted that full Miranda warnings were
required in juvenile proceedings," but assuming that they were, he
thought that the oral and written warnings given in this case were suf-
ficient, because Mi randa did not require "...a ritual of words to be
recited by rote according to didactic niceties. "''^^
1 ?Q
Both eighth circuit cases, Loray v. Yeager and Fugate v. Gaffney,
dealt with pre-Mi randa confession cases, decided against the defendant on
^^
^nited States v. Fowler , 476 F. 2d. 1091 (1973)
^^^Ibid., p. 1094.
^ ^^Loray v. Yeager , loc. cit.
^^Q Fugate v. Gaffney , 453 F. 2d. 362 (1971).
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the basis of the voluntariness of the confession under the totality of
the circumstances rule. The Fu^ case is notable because of Judge
Heaney's dissent, in which he, like Kiley and Stevens in the Fowler
case, abandons the voluntariness test and seems to opt for something like
a per se rule in juvenile confession cases:
Two recent Supreme Court cases have construed Gal legos
as holding, m essence, that a confession secureTTFHF^
fifteen-year-old child in the absence of counsel or aparent capable of protecting the child's rights, violates
the due process clause of the Constitution. '31
Retreating slightly from this position, he argues for at least a higher
standard for judging juvenile confessions:
The Supreme Court has always paid special heed to the age of
the offender in determining whether or not a child's confes-
sion is voluntary and even though the same test was aoplied.
I.e., the totality of the circumstances test, it has always'
been applied more strictly in cases involving defendants of
Caril Fugate's approximate age.'-^<^
Although these cases are not strictly comparable, the liberal
judges want to apply constitutional standards equal to or higher than
adult standards in juvenile cases. Moreover, their emphasis on the
presence of counsel in judging the voluntariness of a waiver or confes-
sion comes close to applying a per se rule in the Escob edo-Miranda
tradition where one factor such as age or one defect in the warning,
or failure to provide counsel are determinative of the issue. Thus
one sees the continual emphasis of the more "liberal" judges on what
critics term as "technicalities" rather than an attempt to fathom the
actual voluntariness or i nvol untariness of the confession.
^^hbid
., p. 368.
^^^Ibid., p. 385.
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Harris v. Newjrorkl^S
m^peaehment Issue
One of the first fruits of the "Nixon Court" was the controversial
Harris v. Newjork, which so.e critics clai. partially reversed the
Miranda decision by allowing the prosecution to introduce tainted
confessions, not as direct evidence, but in order to i.peach the testi-
mony of defendants who took the stand in their own defense. Four cases
involving Harris and related issues of impeachment were heard by the
Courts of Appeals in fiscal 1973.
In the second circuit case of United States v. I<ahan,''34 ^ahan had
lied in claiming that he lacked funds for a lawyer and wanted one
appointed for him. This lie was used to impeach his credibility when
he took the stand to defend himself against charges of perjury and illegal
aid to aliens. He claimed that this use of his lie violated his rights
under both Escobedo and Miranda
, as it penalized the exercise of
constitutional rights. Judges Smith and Feinberg agreed and voted to
overturn his conviction. Smith wrote:
The government's claim that the privilege [fifth and sixth
amendment rights alluded to above) does not extend to false
statements is not well taken. The ultimate truth of the
matter asserted in the pre-trial request for appointed counsel
is of no moment. A defendant should not be forced to gamble
his right to remain silent against his need for counsel or
his understanding of the requirements for the appointment of
counsel .. .Defendant was required to speak in order to obtain
appointed counsel .135
Judge Mansfield, however, dissented. He argued that, although it
was "settled that self-incriminatory statements given at a pre-trial
^^^Harris v. New York , 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
^ United States v. Kahan, 479 F. 2d. 291 (1973).
^^^Ibid.
, p. 292.
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hearing in support of application for enforcement of fourth and sixth
amendment rights may not be later admitted at trial as part of the
government's case.. .this (exclusion) does not extend to perjury or
false statements. "136
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
incriminating statements given at pre-trial hearing in support of
applications for enforcement of constitutional rights was not, accord-
ing to Mansfield, to preclude the accused from telling the truth at
the pre-trial hearing. No legitimate interest, he argued, is served by
extending the rule to outright perjury or falsification.
It is unnecessary to grant him a license to falsify in
order to protect his exercise of pre-trial constitutional
rights.
Moreover, Mansfield continued, the other evidence of guilt was over-
whelming.
In his dissent Mansfield demonstrated the emphasis on getting at
the truth as a value to be counterpoised against the value of preclud-
ing self-incrimination. This argument for protecting the truth-seeking
function of trial courts was at the heart of the Supreme Court's
decision in Harris v. New York to permit the use of tainted statements
to refute in-court testimony when a defendant chose to take the stand. ""^^
A second aspect of the Mansfield dissent emphasized his faithfulness to
precedent. In the cases seen so far he went strongly on record in
136 ibid
., pp. 295-6.
137 ibid
., p. 296.
138iponical ly, allowing coerced statements to be used for impeach-
ment purposes abandons also the old common law rule that coerced state-
ments are themselves untrustworthy evidence.
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support Of both riiranda. v. UnUel^tates and its seeding contradiction,
Harris v. Nev^. Glendon Schubert would equate such seeming ideo-
logical inconsistency with "dogmatism" as a characteristic of the
"judicial mind."^^^
MieA.States ex,_X^ New Jerseyl^O in the third circuit
involved another impeachment issue. Burt, after shooting a "friend,"
left the scene and was arrested a few hours later on a breaking and
entering charge after being discovered asleep in an abandoned store.
On his arrest for the breaking and entering charge, he did not mention
to the police that he had earlier shot his "friend." Later, on trial
for murder, the prosecution attempted to use Burt's silence on this
point to impeach his testimony that the shooting was accidental. If
the shooting had been accidental, contended the state, Burt would not
have remained silent, but would have sought aid or enquired as to the
condition of the friend. On appeal, Burt contended that the use of his
post-arrest silence violated fifth amendment rights guaranteed in
Miranda .
In a per curiam opinion, Judges Van Dusen and McLaughlin, with
Rosenn writing a concurring opinion, sustained the use cf silence for
the purposes of impeachment on two grounds: one, that "the jury had
adequate basis (for its verdict) without the aid or influence cf the
contested evidence," and, two, that since Burt had not been accused of
murder at the time, he was not in the kind of accusatorial situation
1
Glendon Schubert, loc. cit., chapter one.
1 AO
United States ex. rel
.
Burt v. New Jersey , 475 F. 2d. 235
(1973).
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to which Miranda rules applyj^^
Rosenn, however, chose to base his concurrence on Harris v.
New York
.
I parceiye no difference between impeachment by priorinconsistentstatements made in the absence of a Miranda
warningand impeachment by prior silence inconsistiHt
withtrial testimony which justifies not applying the
Harris rationale in the present case. In weighing the
value to society of ascertaining the truth in the judicialprocess against the value to the individual of protection
against self incrimination, the court determined in
^^^'"'"is that the former value must under some circum-
stances be given priority when the two values conflict
directly. '^'^
To Rosenn, the coercive effect here was minimal and not substantial
enough to "raise the defendant's right... over society's interest pn
discovering the truth]. "^^^ Thus Rosenn, like his fellow Nixon appoin-
tee Mansfield, strongly defended the controversial Harris v. New York
decision and stressed the truth seeking functions of the trial courts.
In a similar case in the fifth circuit, Judge Morgan, supported
by Clark and District Judge Skelton, also held that Harris v. New York
allowed the use of a defendant's silence to impeach his testimony once
he had taken the stand. Appellant Ramirez had claimed under oath that
he had been coerced into selling marijuana and heroin by a stranger from
Mexico and had been glad to be caught. On cross examination and in his
summation, the prosecutor pointed out that Ramirez had never told that
^^hbid
., p. 236.
^^^
Ibid
., p. 233.
^^^Ibid.
,
p. 239.
l^^United States v. Ramirez, 441 F 2d. 950 (1971)
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Story before, particularly not when he was arrested. Morgan explained.
Once Ramirez elected to testify.
..he became subject to thetraditiona truth testing devices of the adversary procesincluding the right of the prosecution to show his prior
arresTl45
°^ remaining silent at the time of his
The identical issue faced a panel in the tenth circuit. ""^^ There,
however, a divided court reaffirmed a district court's dismissal of
Johnson's in-court testimony with his prior silence. Johnson had taken
the stand to claim that the woman he was accused of raping had consented
after he caught her stealing his car. The prosecutor on cross examina-
tion rejoined that Johnson, when arrested, hadn't told the police that.
The prosecutor also alluded to Johnson's silence in his summary state-
ment to the jury. Judges Lewis and Murrah reasoned that Harris v.
^^^^ Yoi^k allowed the introduction only of inconsistent or contradictory
statements, and that silence was not such a statement.
You would have to start warning a suspect that his silence
could be used against him.''^^
Judge Brei tenstein, in dissent, contended that
The majority throws up yet another road block to impede the
search for truth in the administration of criminal justice. ..
Harris, he argued, "destroyed Miranda . " Pointing to the conflict
between the fifth amendment's right against self-incrimination and the
duty to testify truthfully, he held that
the majority loses sight of the balance which must be
^^
^Ibid ., p. 954.
^^^Johnson v. Patterson , 475 F. 2d. 1066 (1973).
^^^Ibid., p. 1068.
l^Sibid.
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fn!"Jr'J!'^;"'"'^
converts a criminal trial from a searchor truth to a game to be won by the cleverest players 1^9
According to Brei tenstein, a defendant who takes the stand waives his
right to silence, and there can be no partial waiver of a constitutional
right.
In another impeachment caseJ^O ^^^^^^ appointees Mansfield. Oakes,
and Timbers applied the Harris precedent to Escobedo type cases as well
as to Miranda
.
LaVallee, convicted of two murders, had been denied his
request to see counsel before giving a statement which was used to
impeach his in-court testimony that he had shot in self defense.
To summarize, Nixon appointees Rosenn, Mansfield, Oakes, Timbers,
and Clark all supported the extension of the Harris principle, and they
were joined by Republican Breitenstein and Democrat Morgan. The exten-
sion of the Harris_ principle was opposed by Democrats Smith and Feinberg
of the second circuit, Republican Lewis of the tenth circuit, and Demo-
crat Hurrah of the tenth circuit. In particular, those who see the
Harris case as controlling stress the truth-seeking functions of the
court and employ a "balancing" test to resolve the issue.
Other Cases
The final major issue facing the courts of appeals during fiscal
1973 was that of delayed arraignment and the Crime Control Act's attempt
to reverse Mai lory v. United States in its holding that unnecessary
delay in arraignment constitutes per se ground for exclusion of a
^^^Ibid., p. 1069.
(1972).
^^"^United States ex. rel . Wright v. LaVallee 471 F. 2d. 123
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confession. In six casGs decided in four circuits no judge defied
Congress on this issue, although the ninth circuit overturned one
conviction in which delayed arraignment was a minor factorJ
Circuit by Circuit Analysis*
The second circuit was one of the most conservative in terms of
its stances on doctrinal issues during fiscal 1973. Only Nixon appoin-
tee Mansfield endorsed the Miranda precedent in the eight cases previously
discussed and only Democrats Smith and Feinberg opposed the extension of
the Harris v. New York precedent. Ironically, Mansfield supported the
application of the Harris precedent with the same ardor that he supported
Mj^anda. In spite of the two cases just mentioned there appeared to be
little conflict on the second circuit in confession cases.
Similarly the third circuit emerged as a conservative circuit
although this conclusion is based on only two important cases. The third
circuit endorsed the police practice of questioning without informing
a retained attorney and the use of a suspect's silence for the purpose
of impeaching his testimony. There were no divisions among the judges
on this latter issue, but Nixon appointee Rosenn was most eager to apply
the Harris principle to the impeachment of a defendant's in-court
testimony by use of his prior silence, whereas Van Dusen and McLaughlin
merely avoided the Miranda rule by saying the suspect was not in an
accusatorial situation and therefore Miranda did not apply.
The fourth circuit decided one important and controversial case in
a conservative fashion by sanctioning continued police questioning of a
^^^ United States v. Stage , 464 F. 2d. 1057 (1972).
*The first circuit decided no cases involving alleged coerced
confessions or admissions in fiscal 1973.
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suspect after his refusal to sign a waiver of rights. There was no
evidence of conflict on the fourth circuit on confession issues.
There was almost no evidence of intra-circuit conflict on the
fifth circuit, which occupied a moderate to conservative position in
eleven confession cases. The circuit refused to allow police to
initiate further conversation if a suspect refused to waive his rights,
but they allowed police to pursue the matter if the suspect initiated
conversation after refusing to waive his rights. Panels of the circuit
also sanctioned police disregard of "ambiguous requests for counsel"
and police failure to honor request for counsel quickly. More impor-
tant, panels of the fifth circuit upheld the ambiguous and contra-
dictory police warning which included the statement that counsel could
not be provided here and now, as well as police offers of leniency in
order to obtain waivers, police use of written warnings, the absence of
warnings in out-of-country interrogations and use of a suspect's silence
to impeach his in-court testimony. There was only one dissent in the
eleven cases decided by the fifth circuit.
The sixth circuit heard only one important confession case and
forbade further police questioning after an assertion of rights.
Unlike the other circuits discussed so far, the seventh was more
liberal and more divided. On the two major waiver issues, panels of
the circuit forbade further police questioning after a refusal to waive
rights and required a "higher standard of proof" of waiver in cases
involving questioning without a retained attorney. Here the judges
split, with liberal Democrat Swygert arguing for a per se condemnation
of such practices and Republican Castle opposing the "higher standard
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of proof" rule proposed by Nixon appointee Pell. Similarly, the seventh
circuit was alone in condemning police use of the ambiguous and contra-
dictory Miranda warning that counsel "cannot be provided here and now
^
but later, in court." However, Pell opposed a blanket condemnation of
such warnings (advocated by Swygert) and called for remanding such cases
to the lower court for a determination for the voluntariness of the
waiver on a case by case basis. Finally, the seventh circuit was alone
in requiring full Miranda warnings for juveniles. Only in the approval
of police use of written warnings does the seventh circuit conform to
the "conservative" trends of the other circuits.
During fiscal 1973 panels in the eighth circuit decided four cases
against the accused or prisoners. In three of these liberal Democrat
Heaney dissented. The circuit allowed further police questioning after
a refusal to waive rights, sanctioned the use of videotapes to record
confessions, and allowed the taking of a confession from a juvenile who
was unaided by counsel. Heaney's dissents were based on his attempt to
substitute per se rules for the voluntariness test of waiver of rights.
The ninth circuit is more difficult to classify according to the
major issues discussed earlier because most of the cases were only
marginally related to those issues. Panels of the ninth circuit sanc-
tioned the lack of Miranda warnings in foreign countries even when an
American official was present, did not require express waivers as proof
of voluntariness, and approved inadvertent questioning by a police
officer after a suspect had refused to waive his rights. Only in the
case of a suspect deemed too emotionally upset to waive his rights, did
a panel of the ninth circuit overturn a conviction, and this case divided
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liberal Democrat Ely and conservative Republican Jertberg, the latter
wanting to affirm the confession as spontaneous and voluntary.
The tenth circuit decided in a split decision, to disallow the
use of a defendant's prior silence for purposes of impeaching his in-
court testimony. Republican Breitenstein dissented, arguing for the
application of the Harris doctrine.
Finally, the District of Columbia circuit decided two confession
cases against the accused, one because defendant's request for counsel
was too ambiguous and the second, because the court decided that a
suspect had intelligently waived his rights. In the latter case, an
en banc decision, three liberal Democrats on the circuit opposed three
conservative Nixon appointees, one conservative Democrat and two moderate
Democrats.
Concl usions
The qualitative analysis of confession cases, like the bloc analysis,
included too few of the Nixon appointees to draw any but tentative con-
clusions. However, Nixon appointees behaved like a diverse group rather
than a narrowly conservative monolith. Stevens of the seventh circuit
twice disagreed with Visiting Judge Kilkenny of the ninth circuit. Pell
disagreed with both Rosenn and hunter of the third circuit, as did
Stevens and Mansfield of the second circuit. Stevens emerges as a
"liberal" on confession issues. Kilkenny, Rosenn and Hunter are "conser-
vatives," Pell a "moderate," and Mansfield was a "liberal" on the waiver
issue and a "conservative" on impeachment issues. Only on the latter
impeachment issue were five Nixon appointees unanimous in support of the
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"conservative" doctrine. These five were Oakes, Timbers, and Mansfield
of the second circuit, Rosenn of the third, and Clark of the fifth.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The major findings of this study include the following:
(1) When appeals judges were aggregated in terms of their
scores on criminal procedures cases, differences were observed in
the voting behavior of Nixon appointees as compared to non-Nixon Demo-
crats and non-Nixon Republicans during fiscal 1970 to 1973.
(2) Nixon appointees voted as if they were more "conservative"
than these other two judge groups on both unanimously and non-unanimously
decided cases when voting behavior was examined in the aggregate, when
median scores of the three judge groups were compared, or when percen-
tage of judge groups falling into the "conservative" category or bloc
was computed. Democrats were the most "liberal" group on the basis of
these measures, and Republicans fell somewhere between Nixon appointees
and Democrats.
(3) However, when the circuit was introduced as a control, it
was found that (a) the relationship between the three judge groups
varied from circuit to circuit with only six circuits conforming to the
hypothesis; (b) the composite and median scores of Nixon appointees and
non-Nixon Republicans outside the South were virtually identical when
only the cases of fiscal 1973 were considered; (c) bloc analysis of
individual circuits revealed that Nixon appointees do not constitute
monolithic and sharply "conservative" blocs in any but the District of
Columbia circuit, where voting patterns of Nixon appointees were similar
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to voting patterns of Nixon appointees to the Supreme Court.
(4) Moreover, when other background characteristics were entered
as controls on the appointing administration variable, the latter was
found to account for only a small proportion of the observed variances
in voting behavior among the judges of the Courts of Appeals.
(5) There also appeared to be a relationship between the scores
of Nixon appointees and their sponsoring Republican Senator, where one
existed. The most "conservative" Nixon appointees were recommended, for
the most part, by the most conservative Republican Senator, or were the
choices of the Administration in the absence of eligible Republican
sponsors. This suggests that Senatorial courtesy was an obstacle
to
the attainment of preferred administration nominees.
(6) Finally, doctrinal analysis of confession
cases also indicated
that Nixon appointees did not always agree on confession
issues, varying
in their legal positions not only from circuit
to circuit, but within
some circuits.
(7) The tentative conclusion, then, of
this study is that, although
Nixon appointees did appear more "conservative"
when their voting
behavior was aggregated, they constituted, with
the exception of the
District of Columbia circuit, nothing like
the cohesive "conservative-
bloc of Nixon appointees which dominated
criminal justice issues on the
Supreme Court over roughly the same
period. The next section of this
chapter will try to suggest why this
was the case.
Explanation of Findings
The findings of this study tend
to confirm the view that the
appointing administration faces
almost no obstacle from the opposition
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party in its judicial appointments to the lower courtsJ Congressional
Democrats not only failed to oppose the Nixon Administration's lower
court appointments, they created numerous new judicial positions for
the Administration to fill, despite the latter's professed intention to
"pack" the courts. How does one explain the complicity of Congress on
the one hand, and the failure, on the other, of the Nixon Administration
to take greater advantage of its opportunity? As has been shown, the
behavior of Nixon appointees was not radically different from that of
their predecessors.
For one thing. Southern Democrats, some of whom dominated key
committees in the House and Senate, were essentially in harmony with the
Administration's views on criminal issues. Liberal Democrats were
accused of being "coddlers" of criminals, in the over-simple rhetoric
of the aroused political climate of the time. As with other complex
civil liberties issues, a popular constituency for criminal defendants
was not available to support politicians who might have opposed tougher
anti-crime measures. Finally, the Nixon Administration was freed by the
intermediate nature of circuit court appointments which are not the
responsibility of the organized opposition party (as Supreme Court
appointments are) or of individual Senators from his own party (as
district court appointments are). As a result, the Nixon Administration
found less systematic and institutionalized opposition to its circuit
Although there is evidence of effective opposition from individual
Republican Senators, particularly in the second and third circuits, the
liberal voting scores of Nixon appointees in the second circuit are
based on only a few non-unanimous cases and conflict with their clearly
more "conservative" score on unanimously decided cases, which were
numerous. Thus these classifications must be regarded cautiously.
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court appointments than to its Supreme or District Court appointments,
since Congressional responsibility was not as clearly defined at that
level
.
Why then was there no radical swing to "conservatism" at the cir-
cuit level? For one thing, the lower federal judiciary was already
"conservative" if one compares it to the liberal majority of the Warren
Court on confession issues, or if raw voting statistics are examined
for fiscal 1973. Secondly, because the Courts of Appeals lack control
over their docket, cases there may pose fewer opportunities for discre-
tion than is the case on the Supreme Court. Thirdly, conservative
parties in the United States have historically regarded the unelected
judiciary as their natural ally against the leveling impulses of popular
majorities. Perhaps too, the Nixon Administration found itself ambiva-
lent about "court packing" and attacks on court credibility. In a
similar way, the Republican Party has been closely tied to the American
Bar Association's Committee on Federal Judiciary since the Eisenhower
Administration. This tie, explicitly acknowledged at the lower court
level, may have inhibited the appointment of "political animals" to the
Courts of Appeals, although Goldman has found that Nixon appointees had
more extensive political backgrounds than did Eisenhower appointees and
closely resembled Kennedy and Johnson appointees in the nature and extent
2
of their political involvement.
Thus there are certain built in checks, Senatorial courtesy, the
American Bar Association, the commitment to an independent judiciary.
p. 941
Sheldon Goldman, op. cit. , "Johnson and Nixon Appointees,"
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the routine nature of many cases, and the "professionalism" of most
judges, which probably operate to prevent radical and uniform swings
in lower court policy and personnel when conservative parties are in
power, factors which may be weakened when liberal parties are making
the appointments. 3 These factors probably account for the basic similar-
ity of Nixon appointees to their brethren on the United States Courts of
Appeals and the mild nature of the change there.
Future Research
The findings of this study suggest several possible areas for
future research:
(1) In light of the discovery that Nixon appointees were
considerably more "conservative" than non-Nixon Republicans on criminal
cases in the fifth circuit, it would be interesting to study race
relations cases decided in that circuit from fiscal 1970 to the present
to see if the gap between Nixon appointees and non-Nixon Republicans
and Democrats extends to race relations cases. This is of particular
interest because of the tacit linking of "law and order" and racism in
the Nixon and Wallace campaigns of 1958.
(2) Another research possibility concerns the impact of higher
per judge caseloads on judicial behavior in the Courts of Appeals.
From a cursory view, it appears that there is a larger gap between judge
scores in unanimous and non-unanimous cases in the busier circuits,
than in those less busy. This could be caused by the more perfunctory
-3
Of course the Senatorial check on Democratic Administrations
becomes rather formidable when the party also possesses a large
majority in Congress, as one can see from "conservative" nature of
Democratic appointees in the South.
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nature of review in those circuits or the more frivolous nature of
appeals there, but the subject deserves further exploration in light of
the widely recognized problem of the quality of justice in overcrowded
urban trial courts.
(3) Instead of inferring the appointment practices of the Nixon
Administration from campaign statements and subsequent performance of
its nominees, one could attempt to gain access to Justice Department
files and interview former Nixon Justice Department officials to ascertain
how direct a factor law and order views of particular judges were in the
selection or rejection of judges, and whether subsequent judicial
performance conformed with promise at the time of the appointment. No
one has yet gained access to those files, however.
(4) In light of the slim links discovered between voting behavior
in criminal cases and selected socio-political background character-
istics, research might be considerably revised to identify factors
related to early "socialization" of judges rather than to social class,
as voting in criminal cases might be better related to "tough-mi ndedness"--
"tender-mindedness" than to "1 iberal ism"--"conservatism."^ Gender, for
instance, is a characteristic related to differences in early condition-
ing, although it would be of limited usefulness in the study of judges
because of the great preponderence of males in those positions. Simi-
larly, religion might be examined more in terms of the nature and
influence of religious doctrine and moral concepts associated with them
There is support for this characterization in popular parlance
where judges or potential judges are characterized as "soft" or "tough"
on crime rather than "liberal" or "conservative." Additionally, it
can be argued that criminal issues at the appellate level are procedural
or "means" issues rather than "ends" issues.
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than in terms of the class connotations of different religions. Addi-
tionally, psychological questionnaires might be utilized, although many
judges might be reluctant to participate in such an exercise.
(5) Finally, additional non-unanimous criminal cases for fiscal
1974 and 1975 should be gathered so that more of the Nixon appointees and
more circuits could be included in the bloc analysis and so that more of
the Nixon appointees could be more confidently characterized as to their
attitudes on criminal issues. This is particularly important with
regard to the tentative nature of the findings in the second and third
circuits which showed Nixon appointees to be more liberal than the other
two groups on the basis of only a few cases.
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